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Researchers suggest that as public scrutiny and video recording of violent/tumultuous police 
encounters increase, police would back away from proactive enforcement, resulting in an 
increase in crime—the Ferguson Effect.  Recent scholarship refined these concerns over police 
disengagement with the study of de-policing, while other scholars explored police self-
legitimacy, in order to explain law enforcement behavior, given the immediacy and ubiquity of 
social media and digital communication.  This study surveyed 792 law enforcement officers from 
10 different police agencies in the United States, to ascertain if police officers’ personal and 
contextual characteristics influence their decision to either take enforcement action (i.e., 
summons or arrest) or extend discretion (i.e., let them go) to the people they interact with during 
minor offenses.   Respondents were presented with six vignettes, which included cars stops, 
public demonstrations, and street fights.  The first three scenarios established a behavioral 
baseline for law enforcement action, while the next three scenarios had the added variable of 
presenting challenges to the officer’s authority: cell phone recording, verbal challenge, or a 
passive challenge (e.g., jotting down name, badge number, etcetera).  Respondents were 
 v 
provided open fields in the survey to explain their enforcement decisions. Logistic regression 
testing found significance between challenging law enforcement and the resulting enforcement 
decision.  The presence of cell phones recording police-public interactions will often not end in 
enforcement.  Verbal and passive challenges however, will result in the officer taking 
enforcement action. When police are dealing with members of minority communities they are 
likely to extend discretion 65% of the time.  Enforcement action taken for teenage offenders is 
about 49%.  Testing for intersectionality demonstrated significant relationships for race and 
gender, that would not be readily discernable with traditional variable designations.  This study 
concludes with a policy recommendation based on the New York City Police Department’s 
recruitment strategies to address one of the primary concerns in policing—effective recruitment 
policy to create tomorrows equitable and inclusive police departments.  
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On August 9, 2014 an unarmed Michael Brown was shot and killed by a Ferguson, 
Missouri Police Officer (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015b).  Brown’s death was one of several 
deaths (mostly unarmed black men/youth) resulting from police contact during the course of 
apprehension, investigation, mistaken use of force, or while in custody—Eric Garner (July 
2014), Akai Gurley (November 2014), and Tamir Rice (November 2014).  Social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube were used to broadcast cell phone footage of 
many of these types of fatal encounters with police.  Their deaths (along with several others 
before and after 2014) sparked national discussions on policing.  There were protests in many 
American cities.  Two New York City police officers were assassinated on December 20, 2014 
by a perpetrator, stating he acted out of retaliation to the climate created by police (Mueller & 
Baker, 2014; New York City Police Department, 2015).   
The national conversation over police/public behavior continued into 2015. In July 2016, 
five Dallas police officers were killed and nine injured by an assailant just days after the police 
killings of Alton Sterling in Louisiana and Philando Castile in Minnesota. The immediacy of 
social media often fueled the public narrative of police killing unarmed men of color, even when 
that narrative was incorrect (Mac Donald, 2016).  The “hands up don’t shoot” mantra commonly 
chanted at anti-police demonstrations on the heels of the Ferguson shooting was predicated on a 
false narrative that Michael Brown had his hands up and was surrendering to Ferguson Police 
Officer Darren Wilson (U.S. Department of Justice Report, 2015b).  Emerging from these events 
was concern that the continued barrage and devaluing of police, coupled with legitimate threats 
to officer safety and job security would result in police choosing not to do their jobs, triggering 




Local governments and police departments (for a variety of reasons) were slow to 
respond to dispel viral social media narratives and reassure communities, which may have 
contributed to escalating community malcontent.  The lack of appropriate government response 
to community frustration after police shootings in 2014, was most notable in Ferguson, Mo., 
where “the riots that followed the fatal police shooting of Michael Brown...[demonstrated how 
police] did not understand the gravity of the public anger and fired ‘Stingerballs, PepperBalls, 
bean bag rounds and baton rounds’ in failed attempts to quell the escalating disturbance” 
(Serrano & Pearce, 2015).  The U.S. DOJ report on the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) 
suggests the FPD’s poor response was probably the result of executive miscalculation. “It 
appears that many police and City officials were unaware of this distrust and fear of Ferguson 
police among African Americans prior to August 2014” (Department of Justice, 2015, p. 83).  
For example, Ferguson’s Chief told DOJ that “prior to the Michael Brown shooting he thought 
community-police relations were good” (Department of Justice, 2015, p. 83).  
Candid and credible counter-messaging after tumultuous police events is critical in 
staving public protests.  The public narrative and perception after the civil unrest in Ferguson, 
Missouri suggested American police officers are abusive, militarized, and racist against minority 
communities.  Bratton (2014; 2015a; 2015b; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Tumin, 2012) 
explained that police culture is a complex construct of multiple internal and external influencers. 
Failing to clearly define law enforcement’s role as protector and tip of the spear against crime 
and disorder puts the public in danger from criminals and erodes public trust in police 
(specifically) and government (overall).  Given the current state of American policing, this 
dissertation examines the role officers feel they have in society and what social 




Research exploring police behavior and police efficacy often examines officers’ roles by 
assessing public/community satisfaction in patrol zones/sectors, hot spots, or community 
policing programs and their ability to reduce crime (Gelber, Isen, & Kessler, 2014; Heller, 2014; 
Billies, 2013; Hawdon & Ryan, 2011; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010; Gianakis & Davis, 1998; 
Liou & Savage, 1996). Recent scholarship has delved into assessing officer self-worth and 
whether self-definition impacts officer performance (Nix & Wolfe, 2015; Nix & Wolfe, 2016; 
Wolfe & Nix, 2016a; Wolfe & Nix, 2016c).  Of the many studies on police behavior, the existing 
research neglects to examine how police officers perceive their role in addressing medium to 
low-level criminality (i.e., some misdemeanor offenses and petty offenses/violations) that do not 
mandate automatic arrest (i.e., discretionary enforcement action). This researcher chose to 
exclude more serious offenses (i.e., felonies) because they often mandate arrest (e.g., robbery, 
felonious assault, sexual assault, grand larceny, burglary, etcetera) and leave officers little 
discretion (New York City Police Department Patrol Guide, 2017). Measuring more serious 
offenses is difficult for researchers to gauge, even when respondents are promised anonymity 
during surveys or interviews, because officers admitting they chose not to arrest a subject for 
serious offenses (e.g., felonies or violent misdemeanors) may constitute official misconduct.  
Problem Statement  
This study researches police behavior post-Ferguson by exploring police/LE perceived 
roles and their resulting enforcement decisions.  Is there a relationship between perceived roles 
and police behavior? Do officers change their exercise of discretion based on the threat of social 
media exposure, the race, or gender of the subject, or does this type of police behavior vary by 




ascertain, “Are police officers in America consistent in their exercise of discretionary 
enforcement?”  
Law enforcement officers from ten departments in North American cities in the United 
Stated are the unit of analysis in this study. The independent variables in this study fall into two 
categories: 1) Personal characteristics (age, race/ethnicity, gender, education, family status), and 
2) Contextual characteristics (rank, tenure, assignment, role).  The dependent variable is the 
dichotomous decision (yes/no) to take police enforcement action (either arrest or summons) for 
misdemeanor and petty offenses. Researchers advocate both personal as well as contextual 
characteristics influence police decision-making (Brooks, Piquero & Cronin, 1993; Brown & 
Frank, 2006; Paoline, Myers & Worden, 2000; Poteyeva & Sun, 2009; Sun 2003).  
Significance of the Problem  
If compromised police-community relations remain unaddressed, a continued anti-police 
narrative will only erode police-community trust.  Police derive the requisite power and 
legitimacy to do their jobs from the people they serve (Tyler 1990; Tyler 2004; Tyler 2011; Tyler 
& Huo, 2002; Ivkovic, 2011).  The literature demonstrates police (and the culture of policing) are 
essentially barometrically sensitive to both positive and negative public sentiments.  The extent 
of this sensitivity on law enforcement’s ability to do their job is under examination here.  
There are also grave political and policy implications with trying to define, measure, and 
counteract the Ferguson Effect as we have seen seminal political issues like health care, gun 
rights, and immigration policy subject to moral panics (a sense of policy urgency) which often 





Ferguson, police behavior, and policy   
The urgency in exploring this topic is partially driven by the ubiquity of cell phones and 
their ability to broadcast potentially volatile interactions with police, with no context or 
exposition.  From an advocacy and social justice perspective, recording police-public 
interactions, is an important tool in correcting disparate policing practices across different 
communities.  Gonzales and Cochran (2017) specifically examined BWCs and argued that, 
“people are less likely to engage in socially undesirable behavior if they know they are being 
watched” (p. 309).  This is relevant to this research because, “This civilizing effect also operates 
on the other party in the encounter—the police officer,” which demonstrated officers with BWCs 
used force half the time, and received one-tenth as many civilian complaints (Gonzales & 
Cochran, 2017, p. 309).   
Irrespective of the recording platform (i.e., cell phone or BWC), the public’s safety 
cannot be compromised by any potential chilling effect from introducing video capture and 
broadcasting.  De-policing would be a form of chilling effect.  Chilling effects usually follow a 
predictable pattern, eventually fading, with a return to normalcy.  Similar disengagement 
behavior (called burnout) is observed among social workers and psychologists when clinical 
practitioners are faced with powerlessness and ineffectiveness in helping their clients/patients 
(Skovholt, Grier, & Hanson, 2001).   
In policy analysis, we learn that these disruptive events are sometimes sufficient to reset 
the equilibrium and create a new operational standard but there may be a lag effect associated 
with it (Baumgartner, Linn, & Boydstun, 2009).  Resulting policy from these disruptive events 




Research Questions  
This project pursued answers to six research questions.  Central to these questions is the 
importance of discerning what (if anything) changes police enforcement behavior of today’s 
officers.  The basis for these questions recognizes the ubiquity of social media, coupled with 
post-Ferguson protests, the assassinations of police officers, and national discussions on police 
use of force.  These research questions were also designed to foster a greater understanding of 
police behavior by identifying whether personal or contextual characteristics of the officer, 
define enforcement behavior.   
Assessing how police officers perceive and define their roles is critical in understanding 
police behavior.  This explores the malleability of an officer’s perceived role in their decision to 
apply discretion or zero tolerance to certain public behavior.  These questions are also trying to 
define the presence of triggers to de-policing such as cell phones, verbal taunts, or even police 
body worn cameras (BWC), as influencers on enforcement behavior. Several researchers contend 
police behavior and decision-making are related to contextual, individual, organizational, and 
environmental factors (Brooks et al., 1993; Brown & Frank, 2006; Poteyeva & Sun, 2009; 
Worden, 1993).  What remains unexplored is the relationship between these factors and officers’ 
perceived role in influencing decisions during discretionary situations.   
The research questions (RQ) are:  
 RQ 1: Do verbal and non-verbal challenges from the public to an officer influence their 
decision to take enforcement action?  
 RQ 2: Does a police officer’s perceived law enforcement role govern their decision to 




 RQ 3: What personal characteristics of police officers influence their decision to take 
police enforcement action?  
 RQ 4: What contextual characteristics of police officers influence their decision to take 
police enforcement action?  
 RQ 5: What is the enforcement likelihood when police interact with members of minority 
communities?  
 RQ 6: What is the enforcement likelihood when police interact with teenagers?  
 RQ 7: How do law enforcement perceive the media, when reporting on law enforcement 
events?  
 RQ 8: Is there intersectionality occurring between officers’ race and gender in the 
decision to take police enforcement action?   
Since the literature is sparse on the types of challenges likely to change police officers’ 
enforcement behavior, RQ 1 looks to answer whether types of challenges to police officers 
influence their enforcement decision.  For Role Theory to be present, there needs to be a 
measurable nexus where a person’s perceived role (rather than their title) is an influencer in a 
resulting behavior by measuring the presence of statistical significance to their enforcement 
decision, which was the basis for RQ 2.  RQ 3 and RQ 4 examined police officers’ personal and 
contextual characteristics (respectively) in the enforcement decision.  Role Theory posits both 
personal and contextual characteristics shape the role a person plays in society and consequently 
shapes their behavior.  
RQ 1 through RQ 4 are predicated on police officers interacting with only adult subjects, 
with no mention of the subject’s ethnicity.  Given that the events leading up to and eventually 




persons of color) and young people, RQ 5 and RQ 6 ask police officers for their enforcement 
decisions, assuming the subjects were members of minority communities (i.e., non-Caucasian) 
and teenagers respectively.  
RQ 7 was designed to test whether Labeling Theory is present by asking whether 
negative media reporting on law enforcement events (defined as police misconduct stories, 
officers injured in the line of duty, etc.) influence their conduct as police officers.  This ties into 
the survey questions that ask how officers perceive the media when reporting on police-related 
issues. Their open field responses will help qualify their selections to determine whether the 
media’s reporting forms a type of label and whether that label is internalized and adopted in their 
resulting behavior as law enforcement officers.   
RQ 8 originates from the literature on intersectionality to help identify the presence of 
underrepresented groups.  When designing policy or determining strategy, the principles of 
equity and inclusion require that agency leaders and executives make decisions with no disparate 
impact on a population or group.  Intersectionality scholarship demonstrates several examples 
where failing to include an intersectionality test in research (particularly policy research) can 
mask statistically significant groups among a larger aggregate such as gender or race. RQ 8 





Literature Review  
 The literature examining police behavior is well developed, growing, and 
multidisciplinary. Past scholars have examined several characteristics affecting officer behavior 
with particular interest in the areas of arrests and use of force (Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Fyfe, 
1988; Fyfe, 1981).  Recent research exploring contemporary police behavior and its influencers 
examine four key areas: 1) the Ferguson Effect, 2) De-policing, 3) Police officer self-legitimacy, 
and 4) Public perception of law enforcement.  This literature review explores these four areas 
and identifies commonality in the literature, prevalent theories and methods, main findings, 
outliers, and gaps in the literature.   
 Much of the empirical work on police behavior and police conduct center on exploring 
the Ferguson Effect and self-legitimacy.  Of note are four studies on Ferguson—three are 
quantitative studies utilizing a variety of statistical testing (e.g., structural equation modeling, 
ordinary least squares regression, and discontinuous growth modeling) as well as different 
methodologies—analysis of existing government crime data and survey data culled after 
exposure to video vignettes (Greenwood, Sorenson & Warner, 2016; Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe & 
Shjarback, 2016; Nix & Wolfe, 2016). The fourth Ferguson study is a qualitative analysis, 
concluding that it may not be possible to control for implicit bias in the criminal justice system 
after examining the events of Ferguson in the context of jury selection (Foreman, 2015).  
 In terms of policing, self-legitimacy can best be described as the confidence law 
enforcement officers have in their authority (Nix & Wolfe, 2015).  Examinations of police self-
legitimacy are mostly quantitative analyses.  Using multivariate logistic regression, Wolfe and 




their supervisors failed to protect procedural justice within their LE organization.  They also 
found, self-legitimacy positively correlates to trust within a LE agency.   
 LE agency policies that fail to support police officers and control for negative public 
sentiment reduce LE self-legitimacy and negatively impact officer motivation. Nix and Wolfe 
(2015) found that negative publicity lowered officer motivation and decreased their sense of 
motivation.  This resulted in a decreased sense of officer self-legitimacy.  A key finding in the 
Nix and Wolfe (2015) study found that despite an increase in negative publicity, there was no 
statistically significant sense of increased danger to police officers from negative publicity.  That 
finding is promising (in a sample size of 567 officers) because it intimates that despite increased 
negative public scrutiny, officers do not interpret negative publicity as a safety threat from the 
public.   
 A fundamental weakness this researcher observed in these studies of police behavior 
(particularly with self-legitimacy) is that they are not sufficiently temporal.  Studies of 
organizational theory contend that many organizational spikes or incidents of aberrant behaviors 
will typically regress toward the mean over time in healthy organizations (Holzer & Schwester, 
2016; Rainey, 2014; Tompkins, 2005;).  Additionally, worker motivation, organizational culture, 
and worker maturation (Holzer & Schwester, 2016; Rainey, 2014; Tompkins, 2005) are some of 
the key variables that influence worker behavior that may be impacting officer self-legitimacy, 
but those characteristics are not captured in these analyses.  
Early Studies of Police Behavior  
 Although cops will probably tell you, “We’re all the same, we protect people,” this 
oversimplification masks the complex interaction between community and policing in shaping 




found although “local political culture are not related to police style… [there is] a significant 
relationship between population size and style of policing” (p. 461).  Wilson (1968) identified 
three functional categories for law enforcement officers: 1) Law enforcement—legalistic style, 2) 
Order maintenance—watchman style, and 3) Service delivery—informally interact with citizens 
(as cited by Liederbach & Travis, 2008). Larger communities tend toward a legalistic style. 
Smaller communities and poorer communities tend toward the watchman style (Liederbach & 
Travis, 2008).   
 Some studies differ in their findings on the influencers of police officer attitudes and 
behavior but their differences derive from the officer’s assignment.  Engel and Worden (2003, p. 
131) found officers’ perceptions of their supervisors and the priorities set by those supervisors 
(rather than officers’ personal characteristics) “affect [the] amount of time they spend conducting 
problem solving” but this study was conducted with officers assigned to community policing 
units.  Different officer responsibilities within policing appear to have different results.  
What is the Ferguson Effect?  
The Ferguson Effect is defined as, “continuous negative publicity surrounding the police 
at a national level [which results in] the police…withdrawing from their duties in order to avoid 
being the next viral video on YouTube” (Martinez, 2015; Nix & Wolfe, 2016; Sinyangwe, 2016; 
Sutton, 2015).  MacDonald (2016) hypothesized that this chilling effect would result in an 
increase in national crime rates.  The Ferguson Effect is a recent phenomenon fueled, “in large 
part to the advent of social media and the ease with which citizens can record police behavior on 
cell phones and upload to the internet for millions to view” (Nix & Wolfe, 2016).   
Concerns over emboldened anti-police sentiments resulting in police disengagement were 




NYPD Sergeants. In August 2018, two incidents of the public taunting police and confronting 
responding officers, did not end in arrests but was broadcast on social media (Mullins, 2018, pp. 
1-3). A concern with these types of incidents is the fear of the public creating No Go Zones, 
which is a colloquial expression to denote places where certain people are not welcome, and 
where unwelcomed respondents can expect to be treated brusquely, if they decide to enter the 
area. The security concern with these types of confrontations is that law enforcement cannot be 
excluded from their geographical area of employment, regardless of public sentiment.  
Does the Ferguson Effect influence crime rates?  
 Fundamental to the Ferguson Effect is the notion that there will be an increase in crime.   
The discourse on de-policing and its effect on crime was sparked by comments made by then 
FBI Director James B. Comey at the University of Chicago Law School on October 23, 2015.  
Comey speculated the simultaneous increase in murders in some American cities was caused by 
police feeling under siege by social media and videoing police activities. The resulting chilling 
effect (Comey speculated) has led to an increase in some crime.  
Rushin and Edwards (2017) demonstrate how Comey’s observation of increased police 
oversight results in de-policing has been a perennial concern for scholars.  Wolfe and Nix 
(2016a) would agree in part with Comey as their research demonstrates that negative publicity 
makes law enforcement less likely to engage in community partnerships, which is vital in 
cooperative, less intrusive policing (TED, 2015).  The data however on de-policing is not 
conclusive. Studying de-policing has proven difficult. Pyrooz et al (2016) found increased 





Other triggers that impact the crime rate  
Mac Donald’s Ferguson Effect is one example where social changes or pressures on 
police can influence law enforcement behavior.  Strains on police behavior can also come from 
within an officer’s own department.  Unpopular or adverse policy changes in a department in 
conflict with police norms, culture, or sense of self-defined worth can trigger de-policing, 
resulting in an increase in crime. Rushin and Edwards (2017) demonstrated an uptick in crime 
rates for all police departments subject to 42 U.S.C. §14141.  Criminal code 14141 is a 1994 
reform holding LE and corrections personnel accountable for violating the constitutional rights 
of juveniles (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/14141).   
This increase in crime is the result of de-policing which occurs when police “pull back” 
from their duties out of fear of retribution, increased scrutiny, disciplinary action, or resentment. 
For policymakers, “…[there are] serious implications for the study of police regulation…[as 
it]…suggests that attempts to document, oversee, and regulate unconstitutional misconduct by 
American police departments may reduce public safety” (Rushin & Edwards, 2017). The 
outcome may be a hesitancy for reformers and legislatures to enact much needed legislation to 
correct, evolve, or circumscribe police culture.   
 Rushin and Edwards (2017) modeled two scenarios in de-policing. Model one 
hypothesized “the mere presence of public scrutiny…increases crime.” Model two hypothesized 
“the imposition of external regulations increases crime.” Using difference-in-difference 
regression analysis, they found the introduction of external regulations did increase property 
crime rates (including larceny and burglary) from zero year (i.e., time of imposition) through the 




from external regulations (Rushin & Edward, 2017).  Increased scrutiny contributed little to 
increases in crime rates.  
Their study did not explain why external regulation had a frontloaded negative effect on 
crime. We also do not understand which regulations on police increased crime nor do we 
understand the behavioral effect external regulation had in triggering de-policing.  Rushin and 
Edward suggest surveying officers before imposing future external regulations to foment greater 
LE buy-in and thereby lessen the opportunities for de-policing.  
Challenging the notion of the Ferguson Effect  
Sinyangwe (2016) argued that claims of the Ferguson Effect are invalid because the 
expected chilling effect from public protests did not spawn a reduction in police killings. To 
support his claim, Sinyangwe points to 665 police killings in 2014 increasing 8% to 721 in 2015.  
He goes on to argue, “[the] Marshall Project and the Justice Department have found no evidence 
that violent crime has significantly increased among the nation’s largest cities” (Sinyangwe 
2016).  Sinyangwe’s premise is fundamentally flawed since his account does not distinguish 
when police use illegal or excessive force from incidents where law enforcement used justified 
force.  
Pyrooz et al (2016) demonstrated there is no evidence of a Ferguson Effect after 
examining overall crime data statistics 12 months pre-Ferguson and post-Ferguson. However, 
they did witness a rise in post-Ferguson robberies. Although overall national crime is not 
showing signs of increase, Morgan and Pally (as cited in Nix & Wolfe, 2016) found an increase 
in Baltimore’s shootings, homicides, robberies and car thefts accompanied by a decrease in 




While the Ferguson Effect’s impact on crime remains under investigation by researchers, 
the negative publicity from Ferguson and related incidents, “[does] appear to have an effect on 
police behaviors…[and] such an effect seems to occur regardless of whether a city has 
experienced a high-profile incident of its own” (Nix & Wolfe, 2016).  The trepidation or crisis-
of-confidence some law enforcement officers experience from negative media attention and 
public discontent causes some officers to question their self-legitimacy.  For some officers, 
vocal/visible police scrutiny and the added factor of citizens leveraging technology to record 
police activities (i.e., cell phones and social media) may be sufficient to give some officers 
enough pause and self-reflection to reconsider using force, particularly against young men of 
color.  However, there is no evidence that altering or attacking police officer self-legitimacy is 
beneficial to any community.   
De-policing  
Attributed to Ferguson is the idea of police consciously avoiding their sworn duty in 
response to negative public scrutiny of police policies, procedures, and public interaction 
(usually after a controversial exercise of police power or police use of force).  De-policing or the 
deliberate decision by police officers not to take enforcement or proactive action for fear of 
negative public or organizational scrutiny has met with mixed empirical evidence (Pyrooz et al, 
2016).   
Scholars proceed with suspicion when examining assertions of de-policing and 
disengagement on the heels of tumult in police/community relations. According to Stone, 
Foglesong & Cole (2009) the LAPD’s consent decrees did not trigger any form of de-policing.  




proven difficult and an analysis, “requires measurements of police activity which are generally 
not publicly available” (Stone et al, 2009).   
 As proof of police disengaging from proactive enforcement, Mac Donald (2016) refers to 
anecdotes from police officers, expressing a reluctance to proactive policing.  Mac Donald 
(2016) also cites concern from the “Major Cities Chiefs Association in August 2015 [where] 
homicides we up 76 percent in Milwaukee, 60 percent in St. Louis and 56 percent in Baltimore 
for the year…compared with the same period in 2014” (p. 65).  In law enforcement, disengaging 
from the public makes the job of policing more difficult for other officers. Mac Donald (2016, p. 
66) references an NYPD detective explaining, “Every time we [cops] pass up on an arrest 
because we don’t want a situation to blow up, we’ve only made the next cop’s job all the 
harder.”  The resulting disengagement can compromise public safety by creating a sense of 
environmental or normative permissiveness for criminal offending.  
Leveraging claims of de-policing is not without risks for researchers. Depending on the 
operationalization of variables in a study, the severity of an offense disregarded or overlooked by 
police, may itself constitute a crime for law enforcement.  Official Misconduct is a criminal 
offense, defined as knowingly committing or refraining from an act related to one’s official 
functions, constituting an unauthorized exercise of their power (http://www.nycourts.gov). 
Rushin and Edwards (2017) modeled two scenarios for de-policing.  Their first model 
posits an increase in crime as a result of the public lowering or withdrawing legitimacy for law 
enforcement, in response to social media dissemination of negative video footage of police-
public interaction (Rushin & Edwards, 2017).  Their second model suggests an increase in crime 




in response to social media dissemination of negative video footage of police-public interaction 
(Rushin & Edwards, 2017).   
Building on the concepts developed by Rushin and Edwards (2017), this author suggests 
two additional models for future researchers, based on the small but growing body of literature 
on the Ferguson Effect, de-policing, and self-legitimacy.  Model three suggests a generalized 
increased in police scrutiny from the public, triggering de-policing, and a subsequent increase in 
crime.  Model four acknowledges the subsequent rush to enact new or revised 
policies/regulations in response to negative or unpopular police practices, triggering de-policing, 
and a subsequent increase in crime.   
Self-legitimacy Shaping Police Authority  
 In recent years, the study of police behavior has centered around assessing what officers 
think of themselves, under what circumstances will that assessment change, and how lasting is 
the change.  Nix and Wolfe (2015) claim that the Ferguson Effect is not limited to measuring 
increases and decreases in crime but include law enforcement’s perception of their own 
legitimacy (i.e., self-legitimacy). Officers are less apt to engage in community partnerships if 
they view themselves as illegitimate or if they feel the communities they serve view them as 
illegitimate (Wolfe & Nix, 2016a).   
This study examines law enforcement behavior by operating from the presumption that 
“…sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect can be viewed as a negative work-related outcome for 
officers, their supervisors and agencies, and the communities they serve” (Nix & Wolfe, 2016).  
Research indicates officers who felt less motivated as a result of negative publicity expressed a 
reduced sense of self-legitimacy (i.e., self-worth). However, the degree to which officers felt 




related to self-legitimacy (Nix & Wolfe, 2015).  Negative public sentiment failing to trigger an 
increased sense of police vulnerability or compromised officer safety while on patrol is 
important in preventing false notions of police-community polarization and miscommunication.   
A degradation of perceived legitimacy (from the public) and self-legitimacy (by police) 
in law enforcement, perpetuated on social media, alleging continued racial profiling, and abusive 
militarized policing may erode citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy (Tyler, 1990; Wolfe & 
Nix, 2016c).  When the public no longer views police as a legitimate authority representing 
government, the public are less likely to follow police orders or the law (Tyler & Huo, 2002).   
Nix and Wolfe (2016) surveyed sheriffs (post-Ferguson) and found law enforcement 
officers will tolerate varying degrees of public discontent with officer’s job performance and 
challenges to legitimacy, when law enforcement perceive their bosses/supervisors as fair.  Nix 
and Wolfe’s examination of police behavior is an application of Organizational Justice Theory, 
which comes from business management studies.  Nix and Wolfe’s application of Organizational 
Justice Theory posits, just as familial support gets people through difficulties and challenges, so 
can institutional support (through supervisors and leaders) protect officers from perceiving 
greater danger from the public.  For example, recent studies suggest that officers with a greater 
sense of self-legitimacy are more committed to their organization (Tankebe, 2010), more likely 
to embrace the concepts of procedural justice (Bradford & Quinton, 2014), and less quick to 
threaten citizens with force (Tankebe & Meško, 2015).  
Legitimacy and Gender: Relevance of Intersectionality in Policing  
Self-legitimacy is shaped by the public, but it is also shaped within policy departments, by 
the policies, atmosphere, tolerances, and informal rules that exist in each agency.  Pew’s 2017 




Asian counterparts.  For many in American policing, there are the experiences and perceptions of 
Black police officers and then there are the experiences of everyone else.   
For example, Pew found 61% of Black officers feel police do not “spend enough time 
diagnosing a situation before acting” (Morin, Parker, Stepler & Mercar, 2017, p. 13) and only 
32% “characterize relations with blacks in their community as either excellent or good” (Morin 
et al, 2017, p. 16).  This differs greatly from the 60% of white and Hispanic officers who offer 
positive assessments of their relations with black citizens (Morin et al, 2017, p.16).   
Based on Morin et al (2017) African American law enforcement officers regularly report 
feeling less represented by their departments and share a similar narrative with African American 
citizens/residents that recognizes a disparate societal system based on race (Madhani, 2017; 
Morin et al, 2017).  There is no current research examining the intersection of race and gender 
for police officer willingness to engage the public and when engaged, examine LE willingness to 
extend the public discretion. Based on existing research, examining intersectionality in this study 
(by combining variables race and gender) is important in identifying whether interracial group 
differences exist.   
Crenshaw (1989) posits that a better understanding of disparate impact on race and 
gender, is to examine them as intersecting variables (i.e., intersecting oppressions).  Isolating 
gender or race alone (as independent variables) fails to incorporate the multiplicative impact both 
social circumstances have on the individual.  Intersectionality was developed from feminist 
theory (Crenshaw, 1989) and helps to identify disparate impact that may normally be hidden 
within traditional variables.   
Past research on intersectionality explored topics such as criminal offending and 




and treatment for psychopathy, as they relate to criminal offending and race. For example, Bell 
(2013) found young men of color created higher rates of offending (p. 103) compared to youth of 
other races and genders, but the higher rate only presented itself in young adulthood, not in 
younger juveniles.   
While examining the intersectionality of gender, race, and psychopathy in predicting 
criminal offending, researchers found Black males are two times more likely than White males to 
commit violence and inmates with psychopathy or anti-social personality disorder (APD) are 
almost twice as likely than white males to get arrested for crime (Baskin-Sommers, Baskin, 
Sommers, & Newman, 2013).  This would have been masked if gender and race were separated, 
since treating gender and race as separate variables found males of either race with either APD or 
psychopathy offended more than females (Baskin-Sommers et al, 2013).   
Public Perception of Law Enforcement: Fearing a Militarized Police Force  
Open-source news searches of police preparation in response to the Ferguson protests 
showed officers in full gear, heavy vests (i.e., body armor), many shouldering military-style 
carbine rifles.  Of note were the many pictures and video clips of officers mounted on a gunner’s 
turret atop an armored personnel carrier (Elinson & Reinhard, 2017).  As a result, members of 
the public expressed concern and fear of an increasingly militarized police, prior to the Ferguson 
riots.  It was unclear the extent of police efforts to address public concerns over the apparent 
militancy in police preparation to the Ferguson protests.  It may have been helpful for police to 
explain why these tools were prepared for deployment at the time, but not utilized for routine 
patrol.  At the time, a discussion (and public reminder) on the legitimate police uses for military-
style equipment to address terrorism, active shooters, and related incidents may have helped the 




The police killing of people found to be unarmed and posing no actual threat is tragic. 
However, when a civilian’s death is the result of intentional police malice, misconduct, or gross 
police negligence, it needs to be recognized as criminal behavior.  The public argues that the 
militarization of police creates a more militant, up-armored mindset in police officers, which 
allow mistaken or accidental killings to occur.  Balko (2014) explains, when police are allowed 
to up-armor their officers with the tools of war, a militarized and armored police department can 
have an evolving mindset, which may eventually view the public as the enemy.   
Balko (2014) is careful to posit that a militarized police narrative is not solely a publicly 
driven image.  Since 2014, there have been very visible attacks on police officers as well as 
terrorist-related attacks here and around the world.  Police officers are subject to these images, 
just like any other member of the public. A 2018 report from the European Parliament, on 
terrorism in the European Union explained how 62 people died in 2017 from religiously inspired 
attacks (135 in 2016, 150 in 2015, and 4 in 2014).1   
An officer’s sense of an evolving urban terror threat, given the number of attacks in 
recent years, can lead law enforcement to develop their own internalized necessity for hyper-
vigilance, in order to protect themselves in a dangerous world. Although the public has expressed 
fear of an increasingly militarized American police, there are legitimate police safety concerns, 
based on statements elicited from the terrorists themselves.  In police debriefings and intercepted 
communiques (unclassified of course) are statements from terrorists and radicals that were 
deterred from committing large disruptive events, “because the cops were out there doing their 
                                                 
1 The report from the European Parliament entitled, “Terrorism in the EU: Terrorist attacks, 






anti-terror thing,” referring to police heavy weapons deployments and active checkpoints, 
making a successful mass casualty event unlikely (Mercado, 2013).  
To address the public’s concerns over aggressive policing, dialogue between the public 
and police must continue.  This conversation is challenged when police feel the public has no 
confidence in their legitimacy to police, have a diminished sense of professional worth, or feel 
their role does not contribute to public safety. These conversations will be even more difficult to 
initiate if police decide to de-police.  
Evolution of military weapons and tactics in policing  
Balko (2014) explains police departments began formally introducing military tactics and 
equipment back when the LAPD first pioneered the practice in the 1960s with the creation of 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams.  Although an overwhelming number of calls today 
for SWAT teams are to assist in the execution of search warrants (Balko, 2014) municipalities 
like New York City use specially trained SWAT-style units on calls for emotionally disturbed 
people, rescues, and large venue site-security (Civilian Complaint Review Board, 2016; New 
York City Police Department, 2017).  
The reason specially trained and armed police officers are deployed today to serious 911 
calls, is to have immediate access to special weapons and tools, if initial attempts at de-escalation 
and negotiation fail (New York City Police Department, 2017).  The aim is to first utilize less-
than-lethal measures to protect life and stabilize dangerous situations, but have the availability to 
deploy lethal force when necessary (New York City Police Department, 2017).   
Since the September 11th attacks, SWAT-style police units are incorporated into 
counterterrorism/homeland security deployment.  Balko (2014) disagrees with most cases for up-




infrequent to justify escalating public concerns, created when the public sees heavily armed 
police.  Ted Lewis (2011) from the Center for Homeland Defense and Security describes the 
potential for terrorist activity in the U.S. as a low probability, high consequence event driving 
domestic security and policing policy to the cost of billions of dollars since the 9/11 attacks.  
 There are community concerns that U.S. president Trump’s pro-domestic security and 
pro-police platform could hurt police/community relations.  Driving this perception are 
statements from several police unions in the United States, stating their desire to reverse bans 
from the Obama administration on police departments procuring surplus military equipment 
(Elinson & Reinhard, 2017).  James and Else (2014) explain that prior to the ban, LE policy to 
address narcotics and terrorism gave rise to police militarization.  Supplying police with military-
grade equipment is called the 1033 Program. This program “was created by Congress in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for 1997…[authorizing] the Secretary of Defense to provide 
material support to authorized federal and state law enforcement agencies by transferring articles 
suitable for counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities. “These are drawn from Department of 
Defense (DOD) stocks deemed excess to military needs” (James & Else, 2014).  
Final Thoughts on the Literature  
Since the Ferguson Effect is a relatively new phenomenon, the literature on this specific 
topic is sparse.  Nix and Wolfe (2016) observe “we know very little about what is associated 
with officers’ sensitivity to such Ferguson Effect.”  It is possible, arguments in favor of the 
existence of the Ferguson Effect causing increases in crime “are attributed to extraneous factors 
and thus spurious” (Stone et al, 2009). 
The importance of de-policing and self-legitimacy are related to bilateral public-police 




officers shows that although killings have declined since 2014, assaults rose 5.3%.  In 2017, 
60,211 LE officers in the United States were assaulted.  This is the highest number of assaults for 
this demographic since 1994 (see Table 25, Appendix I), when there were 64,912.  
Additionally, a growing U.S. population currently estimated over 324 million 
(http://www.census.gov/) implores scholars to continue examining the Ferguson Effect.  During 
controversial police encounters, viral social media messaging, digital activism, and uninformed 
public reaction may be the “new normal” in American policing.  The policies and training 
enacted by police administrators and politicians in response to this new normal will define the 
future of police-community relations.  
Applying Role Theory and Labeling Theory to Police Behavior  
 This study explores both Role Theory and Labeling Theory to examine police behavior 
and police decision-making.  Role theory comes from Sociology while Labeling Theory comes 
from Criminology.  Each theory is discussed extensively, supported by relevant research, 
applications, and trends.  
Role Theory  
Role Theory and its applicability in studying police behavior developed during the 1980s 
in gender studies, examining societal perceived roles and the behavior of female police.  Biddle 
(1986) explains Role Theory contends that the role an individual assumes reflects social norms, 
contextual demands, and personal views. That role helps define an act or situation the individual 
encounters, resulting in social behavior (i.e., actions).  
Biddle explains, Role Theory posits “persons are members of social positions and hold 
expectations for their own behaviors and those of other persons” (1986, p. 67).  “Role Theory 




depending on their respective social identities and the situation” (Biddle, 1986, p. 68).  Role 
theory, “focuses on interactions between and among individuals, groups, societies, and economic 
systems” (Dulin, 2007, p. 104). A key assumption is for police officers to be rational actors, 
committed to remaining congruent with (and protective of) normative behaviors. In discussing 
Role Theory, it is apropos to use the theatre metaphor, “each actor plays their role.”   
The Five Perspectives of Role Theory  
There are five perspectives in Role Theory: 1) Functional, 2) Symbolic Interactionist, 3) 
Structural, 4) Organizational, and 5) Cognitive.  The Functional approach to Role Theory was 
conceptualized by anthropologist Ralph Linton whose 1936 work was adapted and formalized by 
Talcott Parsons in 1951 (Biddle, 1986).  Functional Role, “…focuses on the characteristic 
behaviors of persons who occupy social positions within a stable social system” (Biddle, 1986, p. 
70).  Here, one’s role is shaped by conforming to normative expectations that prescribe behavior.  
Symbolic Interactionist perspective was developed by George Herbert Mead (1934) to 
explain how one’s role is shaped by norms which act more as a broad set of imperatives allowing 
flexibility for role adaptation.  Structural theory focuses more on the “social environment and 
less on the individual” where individuals form sets or structures and these structures form stable 
organizations (Biddle, 1986, p. 73). 
Organizational Role Theory argues that roles are clearly, “identified social positions 
generated by normative expectations [where] norms may vary among individuals[,]…reflect[ing] 
both…official demands…and…informal groups” (Biddle, 1986, p. 73).  Cognitive Role Theory 
suggests an individual’s perceived expectations of what others expects of them, defines behavior.  




enforcement agencies operate as formal organizations, “…focused on social systems that are 
preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical” (Biddle, 1986, p. 73).  
Defining One’s Role 
In Role Theory, scholars have disagreed on the definition of role.  As cited by Biddle 
(1986) role can “refer to characteristic behavior” (Biddle 1979; Burt 1982), “[designated] social 
parts to be played” (Winship & Mandel, 1983) or “scripts for social conduct” (Bates & Harvey, 
1975; Zurcher, 1983).  It has been argued, the different definitions of role are more stylistic and 
preferential than technical and does not fundamentally change the tenets of Role Theory, which 
contend behavior is defined/shaped by the societal expectations of the role individuals play 
(Biddle, 1986).   
Researchers applying Role Theory to the study of human behavior have struggled with 
the level of importance situation/context and individual personality have in shaping one’s role. 
Alexander and Knight (1971) found, “moreover the social roles that an individual plays has been 
shown to affect the individual’s personality” (as cited in McCall, 1982, p. 288).  Meanwhile, 
Endler and Magnusson (1976) felt, “personality features vary situationally and what situations 
one enters is influenced by one’s personality” (as cited in McCall, 1982, p. 288).  
Organizational Role Theory: Understanding role conflict  
The literature suggests Role Theory is still fundamental to understanding police behavior.  
Researchers are exploring police behavior through officers’ self-perceived roles by examining 
self-legitimacy.  Examining officers’ role in society, broadens our understanding of the societal 
expectations of police as well as the internal expectations of police within their culture and 
profession. Fundamental to Role Theory is understanding role conflict, role taking, role playing, 




Role Theory specifically seems best suited because it posits roles come from, “social systems 
that are preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical” (Biddle, 1986). In that same report, Biddle 
explains: 
Roles in such organizations are assumed to be associated with identified social positions 
and to be generated by normative expectations, but norms may vary among individuals 
and may reflect both the official demands of organizations and the pressures of informal 
groups. Given the multiple sources of norm, individuals are often subjected to role 
conflicts in which they must contend with antithetical norms for their behavior. (p. 73) 
Understanding Ferguson and Police Behavior Through Role Conflict  
The rationale for using Role Theory to examine the Ferguson Effect originates with the 
premise that the public pushback and indignation created from Ferguson, creates role conflict in 
police, which causes some LE officers to disengage and de-police.  Of the criminological and 
sociological theories examined for this research, Organizational Role Theory is best suited to 
examine police behavior in light of the events in Ferguson.  Allen and van de Vliert (as cited in 
Biddle, 1986) explain how changed or clarified expectations cause role conflict and can result in 
behavior outside (or in conflict) with societal position or role expectations and this author 
suspects that is what is affecting police behavior in light of the identified police cultural shift 
after Ferguson.  
[Problems occur] when the actor must cope with changes in social position or 
expectations for the actor’s position. Such experiences typically cause strain, and the core 
of the theory concerns variables that affect the actor’s choice of strategies for coping with 




Sociological theory: Its application in the study of crime and criminal justice  
 Applying sociological theories to studies of crime is not new. For example, the use of 
social ecological theories of crime was used to explain environmental/regional variation in police 
behavior.  However, sociological theories of criminal offending do not always sufficiently 
examine the, “class-based origins of formal social control and the relative autonomy of the 
police” (Miller & Bryant, 1993, p. 133).  This study carefully avoids this flaw found in prior 
applications of sociological theory and criminal justice topics because it includes the public as a 
powerful variable by presuming (and suggesting to other researchers) that the public’s use of 
social media and recording challenges Miller and Bryant’s (1993) position of the relative 
autonomy of police.   
Reexamining officer risk: When careers count  
Earlier discussions of police behavior were shaped by examining the relative risk to 
officer safety from the neighborhood (Skolnick, 1966) which researchers argue is associated with 
the socioeconomic class of the community served (Axenroth, 1983; Martin & Sherman, 1986; 
Niederhoffer, 1967).  With crime at historic lows in cities like New York,2 it is possible that 
officer safety and security is no longer dictated solely by geographically-based violent crime, but 
by the general sense of reduced officer legitimacy.  However, that is not the scope of this study. 
Based on the literature on de-policing and officer self-legitimacy, this researcher hypothesizes 
that an additional threat to officer “safety” comes from the potential of imperiling one’s career 
from community challenges during tumultuous police activity.   
                                                 





Police role behavior and discretion: Understanding the correlation  
Research by Miller and Bryant (1993) reported the police use of discretion is not random 
but correlated to the social class of communities patrolled.  The poorer the community the lower 
the exercise of LE discretion.  Mann’s 1993 report (as cited by Miller & Bryant, 1993) 
acknowledged the difficulty of a general study of a discretion-based theory of police behavior is 
problematic due to the potential influence of high police brutality complaints and the 
disproportionate arrest rates of minorities in measuring officer behavior.   
This researcher disagrees with Mann (in part) since a reliable examination of officer 
discretion may be possible through officer self-reporting but no such studies were found in the 
literature.  This study, as a study of officer discretion, examines the previously under-realized 
impact of the Internet and social media in shaping current discourse and news reporting.  
Labeling Theory: Internalizing Societal Definitions  
 Within Criminology, Labeling Theory purports an offender’s deviant activity is labeled 
by society as negative/deviant, followed by the offender evaluating the veracity of society’s 
label, and if the offender agrees to accept the label (like a self-fulfilling prophecy) engages in 
further delinquency/crime (Cullen, Agnew & Wilcox, 2014).  Central to Labeling Theory, shame 
is an effective societal tool, communicating disfavor with counter-normative behavior.  
However, shaming must have a purpose to be successful. Braithwaite (1989) concluded crime is 
higher when shaming stigmatizes behavior and crime is lower where shaming is reintegrative.  
Shaming works when the offender is given the opportunity to re-enter society by demonstrating 
normative/compliant behavior.  Shaming has a greater chance of success when offenders have 




 If we are to assume Labeling Theory is appropriately explaining police behavior rather 
than their perceived role, we expect to see officers explaining in their opened-ended survey 
responses that societal challenges to their legitimacy had a strong deterrent effect on police 
behavior because the challenge had a shaming effect (resulting in either specific or general 
deterrence). 
Under Labeling Theory, you would assume that police internalize the negative label or 
threat from the public and alter their behavior, as shown in cases of delinquency. In their 
examination of the labeling of convicted felons and its impact on recidivism Chiricos, Barrick, 
and Bales (2007) used hierarchical linear modeling to conclude, “…being adjudicated guilty as a 
felon significantly and substantially increases the likelihood of recidivism within 2 years of 
conviction compared to those who had the felony designation withheld” (p. 570).  
Criminological theory is the pursuit of understanding deviance.  Macro-level theories 
deal with larger group/community/societal behavior while micro-level theories address 
individual/small group behavior (Cullen et al, 2014). Labeling Theory is a macro-level theory.  
This research examines police behavior and predicts the likelihood of officers’ actions rather 
than exploring the severity of their decisions (e.g., discretion, misconduct, or de-policing) under 
the law.  Labeling Theory presents an opportunity to explore the role of the officer which was 
explored by Matsueda (1992) in his longitudinal study of American youth.   
Matsueda (1992) found the internal label of conformist or delinquent is a reflection of the 
appraisal of others.  If Matsueda’s findings can be applied to police behavior, we may see role-
taking, which occurs when the subject puts themselves into the “shoes” of the person appraising 
a situation (i.e., the public, in this study) and formulates options for a “line of action” (Matsueda, 




If respondents state their decisions were based on an internal agreement with public 
classifications of their behavior or worth, and act in accordance with that classification, this 
would be an example of, “role-taking and usually entails taking the role of members in one’s 
reference group, which is the source of one’s values and self-perception” (Matsueda, 1992, p. 
1583). Who is the reference group? Is it the institution/profession of policing? Is it the 
community? The answer is driven by the respondent.  The limitation with applying Matsueda’s 
findings to police behavior is his unit of analysis—American youth—which are heavily 
influenced by their parental reference groups (Matsueda, 1992, pp. 1602-1604).  Clear 
extrapolations to adult behavior may not be as clear as the number and complexity of adult 
relationships will differ than those of youth.  Figure 1 was extrapolated from the works of 
Braithwaite (2002), Becker (1963), Goffman (1963), Lemert (1951), and Cullen et al (2014).  
 
Figure 1: Labeling Theory Diagram 3 
                                                 





Data collection was achieved by administering a 17-question electronic survey to sworn 
police officers from ten police departments in the U.S. to measure enforcement decisions for 
varying scenarios and differing demographics.  Respondents were also asked whether their 
enforcement decisions were influenced by the age of the client (i.e., apparently under 18 years 
old), or the perceived racial membership of the client (i.e., member of the public).  The survey 
concluded by asking officers where they obtain their law enforcement news (e.g., social media, 
print, broadcast news, union notices, etc.) and whether negative news stories involving U.S. law 
enforcement affect their enforcement decisions.  
Survey Design  
 The survey was administered through Survey Monkey.  No personal or identifying 
information was recorded from respondents.  Survey questions were a combination of Likert 
scale and categorical responses in addition to open-ended (i.e., respondent fill-in) responses.  
This survey tool draws on both quantitative and qualitative assumptions and design, using a 
cross-sectional survey research design, collecting data through a questionnaire (Appendix B).   
Vignettes  
Respondents were presented with six scenarios (in the form of vignettes).  These six 
vignettes represent the typical interactions police have with the public.  The first three scenarios 
are: 1) Quality-of-life offense (e.g., loud radio, public drinking, or playing loud music), 2) People 
fighting in the street, and 3) Traffic stop for a minor vehicle infraction.  The next three scenarios 
are similar, except each one introduces a different challenge to officers’ authority: 1) Active cell 
phone recording of the officer’s interactions, 2) Verbal challenges to police authority, and 3) 




At no time are the officers in the scenario physically impeded from doing their job.  None 
of the officers in the scenario were physically injured.  For the scenarios, the officers are in full 
patrol uniform (bullet resistant vest, gun, radio, hat, etcetera) and driving a marked police car.  
There is no doubt or ambiguity to the public detailed in the scenarios that the public is interacting 
with sworn law enforcement officers.   
Using vignettes in survey instruments  
 This researcher’s survey tool incorporated several data collection techniques. In addition 
to pre-coded and scaled responses, this study also used vignettes which are short descriptive 
literary sketches (https://www.merriam-webster.com).  These vignettes use both fixed-choice and 
open-ended responses.  Finch (1987) explains vignettes are desirable survey tools because they 
allow for researcher specified context to answer questions about respondent preferences and 
behavior.  “[T]he respondent is being invited to make normative statements about a set of social 
circumstances, rather than to express his or her ‘beliefs’ or ‘values’ in a vacuum” (Finch, 1987, 
p. 106).  Vignettes free the respondent from a fixed selection of choices (none of which may 
match their opinions/feelings) by providing the contextual framework of a story, without the 
seemingly directionless invitation offered from solely open-ended questions.  
Vignettes were successfully used to test environmental theory and police decision making 
(Phillips & Sobol, 2012) in four police agencies located in New York State, by examining officer 
willingness to make traffic stops.  The researchers in the Phillips and Sobol study argued that 
employing vignettes are a stronger indicator of determinacy than agency-reported data because, 
“[t]he vignette research design…allows for the inclusion of multiple variables and can control 
for those cases where a person is not stopped by officers” (Phillips & Sobol, 2012, p. 555).  The 




the utility of vignettes) which, “possess aspects of a controlled, random experiment and, 
therefore, provide a benefit in studying the judgement of police officers in traffic stop incidents: 
[as well as] collecting data on vehicles not stopped” (Phillips & Sobol, 2012, p. 557). 
Limitations of using vignettes  
There are limitations with using vignettes. Researchers need to ensure the stories in the 
survey are not needlessly complex but sufficiently descriptive so each respondent is clearly 
responding to the same scenario.  Finch (1987) cautions researchers using vignettes to make 
characters believable and understand the difference in asking respondents “What should [a third 
party] do?” versus “What would you do?” since these similar questions can elicit different 
responses from people.  Since this researcher examined normative law enforcement behavior, his 
survey asked respondents to explain what “they” would do.  
Data Entry, Data Management, and Coding Responses  
This researcher was the sole coder for entering data into Stata in this study as well as 
categorizing and classifying respondent’s open-text responses for the scenarios (Appendix J), 
enforcement actions with teenagers (Appendix K), and enforcement with minority community 
members (Appendix L).  The methodology for coding required this researcher to read all 
responses provided and group those written responses based on common answers (creating 
categories).  Open-field responses for the scenarios, teen enforcement, and minority enforcement 
followed questions asking respondents to explain their reason for taking (or not taking) 
enforcement action.  Some respondents chose not to provide an answer for their enforcement 
decisions and their blank responses were coded accordingly.   
Single coder entry by this researcher may raise concerns of interpretation error or 




and posits that training people to perform data entry (i.e., multiple coders) in these types of 
studies has greater potentiality for error since the respondents in this study tended to be older, 
married, supervisors in law enforcement, which mirrored the researcher’s demographic 
classification.  Respondents’ answers in this study, literary timbre, and written vernacular will 
probably differ from that of a teenager or young adult.  There may also be vocational and 
generational differences in how respondents may answer an open-field question (i.e., word 
choices) that may result in interpretation error by someone performing data entry from a different 
demographic.  This could lead to interpretation bias on the part of the data coder and would 
require adequate training by this researcher to ensure consistent and accurate translation of 
respondents’ answers to one of the identified response categories.   
This dataset consists of 792 respondents which proved to be very manageable for this 
researcher.  Single coding also provided a mechanism for overall accountability, demonstrated 
researcher ethics, and ensured data integrity in this research project.  To assume future 
researchers replicating this study would arrive at the exact same open-field coding classifications 
as this researcher would be hubristic.  However, using a single coder does provide a level of end-
point accountability in data management.  This researcher has over two decades of experience in 
law enforcement, which permits a level of familiarity with the vernacular and word-choice used 
in policing that a person from a different demographic, outside the profession, performing data 
entry, may find challenging.  
Population and Sampling Strategy  
 According to the Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008 
(https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf) most LE agencies in the U.S. are small local 




deputies.  That same DOJ report explains, of the 765,000 sworn LE officers in the U.S., 60% 
come from local departments consisting of one hundred or more.  
This study relies on convenience sampling in administering its surveys. With smaller 
police agencies, it is difficult to ensure a statistically valid probability-based sample. 
Convenience sampling is a non-probability-based method, essentially composed of easy to reach 
respondents returning surveys.  Convenience sampling is useful in identifying trends from 
collected data on populations difficult to survey or identify. A key limitation to convenience 
sampling and other types of purposive or judgmental sampling (i.e., samples drawn from the 
researcher’s own knowledge of the population) is the lack of random selection in sampling 
(Maxfield & Babbie, 2015, p. 213). Properly selected random sampling is representative of the 
greater population under examination and allows researchers to generalize from the sample to the 
unobserved population (Maxfield & Babbie, 2015, pp. 202-206).   
Limitations with sampling methodology  
 Most police departments (PD) in the United States are smaller agencies ranging from a 
few dozen to a few hundred officers, highly localized, patrolling populations fewer than 500,000 
people. Larger departments like Chicago PD, Boston PD, Los Angeles APD, Philadelphia PD, 
and New York City PD are often sought for research partnerships and data collection, given the 
potential sample size for officers, as well as resident population. This research project affords 
smaller departments the opportunity to help contribute to emerging law enforcement policy by 
surveying their officers.  
 This analysis is also limited by its post-test design. This study surveys current police 
responses for their self-reporting willingness to engage the public. This study does not measure 




because the hiring of some officers during or after the events of Ferguson make measurement of 
pre-Ferguson police attitudes moot.   
Replicating this study under different conditions  
Future researchers may decide to repeat this analysis as a longitudinal study to ascertain 
changes in police responses—as a function of days between controversial, viral, or public video 
depicting controversial police uses of force.  As a comparison to this study, a similar survey can 
be issued to the public with the unit of analysis as citizens, rather than police officers.  A key 
challenge to the proposed longitudinal study would be maintaining anonymity as the same 
officers would need to be surveyed at designated points in the study.  Wu, Liu, Gandermann, and 
Zumbo (2010, p. 123) also identified four methodological challenges in longitudinal studies 
using multilevel growth models: 1) dealing with changing measures over time, 2) modeling 
residual dependence due to nested data, 3) modeling observed trajectories, and 4) deciding which 
predictors are more important in explaining change over time.   
Research Hypotheses  
 The three research hypotheses for this research project are:  
 H1: The introduction of a cell phone in a manner indicative of recording video 
footage will cause some officers to disengage and decide not to arrest/summons a 
subject. 
 H2: The defined role of the officer as crime fighter will have a greater likelihood 
of arresting/summonsing the citizen/resident.  
 H3: African-American officers will be more likely to exercise discretion in 




The hypotheses used in this study comes from the literature on policing, police culture (as 
it relates to enforcement), community engagement, the Ferguson Effect, de-policing, and self-
legitimacy.  H1 was formulated from the literature where several examples found the introduction 
of a cell phone camera was associated with no enforcement from the officers.  In some examples, 
the officers were seemingly chased away by taunting, hostile crowds (Mullins, 2018).  These 
events were publicly available on social media shortly after they occurred (Mullins, 2018).   
H2 has its origins in the mission statements and credos of countless police departments in 
the U.S. which state that their primary mission (i.e., their principal defined role) is to fight crime 
and enforce the law.  The presumption is that those officers who envision their role as crime 
fighter will have a greater likelihood of arresting/summonsing the citizen/resident.  H3 comes 
from the work by Morin et al (2017) in their study for PEW that found the experiences of 
African-American officers differ from their Caucasian, Hispanic, and Asian counterparts. Morin 
et al argue that for many African-American police officers there are two police departments: one 
African-American—which usually represents a small number of officers—and one that is not 
African-American.  Culturally, many African-American officers find there operational and 
contextual interpretation of policing more in line with (and sympathetic to) minority 
communities as recipients of police policies compared to non-African American officers who 
view themselves (as a cohesive group), administering police services to the public.   
Operationalization of Primary Variables  
 Variable operationalization in this study comes from the literature on Role Theory and 
the characteristics that define one’s role as well as an analysis of the types of challenges and 
attacks officers experienced post-Ferguson (i.e., self-initiated enforcement, responding to 911 




because citizen contact with law enforcement while officers are taking enforcement action can 
constitute some degree of obstruction of governmental authority, subjecting the citizen to arrest.  
This study attempts to ascertain if officers are willing to make arrests, based on their self-
perceived role, even when challenged.  
Dependent variable  
 The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (yes/no) chosen by the respondent to 
indicate their willingness or likelihood to affect an arrest based on the vignette, the race of the 
citizen, or the age of the citizen.  The introduction of a mediating variable for body worn 
cameras (BWC) is an important variable.  Legitimacy and transparency (by leveraging 
technology) were specific hallmarks for the U.S. President’s taskforce on 21st Century Policing 
(see Table 24, Appendix H).   
Independent variables  
The independent variables are comprised of personal and contextual characteristics. They 
are discrete categorical selections.  For personal characteristics, age is a categorical selection in 
five-year increments from 21 through 62 and older.  Race/ethnicity is a categorical selection with 
six choices.  Education offers seven discrete categorical responses for the highest grade 
completed. Gender contains three categories. Family status is a discrete selection from five 
options examining single (never married and widowed), married (including married but 
separated), or divorced.  
For contextual characteristics, rank includes six choices, designed to capture the discrete 
categories based on several law enforcement agencies in the northeastern United States from 
entry-level sworn officer through senior executive.  Tenure is a measure of seniority (in 4-year 




36 years or more. Job assignment offers four choices, based on daily assignment.  Role is a self-
defined characteristic captured by five choices.   
Limitations in variable selection  
Missing from these models is a variable for officer workload.  When examining an 
officer’s decision whether to take police action/engage the public, it would help to understand 
just how busy that officer or sector car team really is. There are different ways to measure this 
but each has its own limitations.  Self-reporting officer workload (number of calls for service) is 
possible, however, it is probably more accurate to use official department data by either querying 
that agency’s dispatch reports or their 911 call center.   
Agencies like the New York City Police Department (NYPD) require patrol officers and 
detective investigators to submit monthly performance reports (i.e., activity reports) to account 
for their productivity and performance.  Unfortunately, patrol officers and field investigators 
account for about half of many departments as the other half are involved in staffing and support 
related functions (e.g., logistics, analysis, supply, procurement, maintenance, information 
technology, and etcetera). 
Some departments use two-person sector car teams while others use solo patrol.  Not 
mentioned in the literature is an analysis of an officer’s willingness to be proactive (even 
aggressive with order maintenance) as a function of the proximity and response time for the 
arrival of backup officers when called.  The difficulty for researchers attempting to 
operationalize workload for comparison across police agencies, comes from controlling for the 
severity of calls (felony, misdemeanor, crimes in progress, low-level requests for service, 
etcetera) and the duration spent on each type of call. While examining just traffic stops, Phillips 




Ethical Considerations  
 Despite earnest data encryption efforts and anonymous surveys, this study does have 
vulnerabilities. In the event a respondent’s comments can be attributed back to the subject, some 
responses may have a deleterious impact on the officer’s relationship with peers, superiors, and 
their department. To guard against this, the surveys were digitally and anonymously 
disseminated through SurveyMonkey.  Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were not collected or 
stored from respondents.  This feature is part of the standard security requests offered by 
SurveyMonkey. Each digital survey is preceded by an informed consent prompt.  
For the purposes of protecting respondents’ anonymity, digital survey administration is 
far more advantageous than paper surveys.  Paper surveys present a greater potential for physical 
breech of anonymity.  Distinctive penmanship, word choice, or writing style can also betray 
anonymity if paper surveys are somehow compromised.   
Data Analysis  
The dataset for this analysis consists of seven hundred and ninety-two law enforcement 
officers from 10 police agencies.  Most of the agencies are small to medium size departments. 
Six of the agencies have a headcount of less than 160 sworn officers.  Three of the agencies are 
more than 160 sworn, but less than 500.  The largest of the agencies in this study (with several 
thousand sworn officers) is located in the eastern United States and were invited to participate 
through their labor unions.   
Since most of the departments in this study are small, none of them are identified.  This 
further protects the anonymity of their respondents.  Instead, the sample was bifurcated into east 
coast and west coast U.S. police agencies, due to their general proximity to either of the nation’s 




Table 1: Overview of Officers from Participating Departments—5 States, 10 Agencies  
Coastal Designation Frequency 
(N=792) 
Percentage 
East Coast (3 states, 5 agencies)  711 90% 
West Coast (2 states, 5 agencies) 81 10% 
Totals 792 100% 
 
Initially, there were 840 survey respondents. However, 48 cases were removed from the 
analysis because most of the data for these responses were either incomplete or missing.  The 
average respondent completed the 17-question survey in approximately 13 minutes.    
Descriptive statistics 
The independent variables selected in this study testing law enforcement behavior were 
modeled after prior studies examining Role Theory and policing (Paez, 2016).  Role Theory 
researchers categorized rank, assignment (job), role, experience, and location (where assigned) 
as contextual variables.  Contextual variables are those traits that can change under different 
environments, communities, or conditions.  Table 2 contains an overview of the contextual 
independent variables in this study.  The typical respondent in this study is described as having 
the contextual traits of supervisory rank (79%, n=622), with a job assignment working in 
patrol/field operations (71%, n=556).  Their tenure is between 11-15 years on the job (30%, 
n=237), with the self-defined role of problem solver (42%, n=331) and unlikely to wear a body 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics—Contextual Characteristics  
Independent Variables Frequency (n) Percentage 
Rank (N=789)   
Supervisory 622 79% 
Non-supervisory 167 21% 
Assignment (N=788)   
Field Operations 556 71% 
Staff & Support 156 20% 
Training 25 3% 
Quality Control 51 6% 
Tenure (N=792)   
New graduate-5 years 54 7% 
6-10 years  91 11% 
11-15 years  237 30% 
16-20 years  165 21% 
21-25 years  138 17% 
26-30 years  59 7% 
31-35 years  35 4% 
36 years or more  13 2% 
Role (N=789)   
Safety Expert 14 2% 
Crime Fighter 229 29% 
Problem Solver 331 42% 
First Responder 150 19% 
Peacekeeper 65 8% 
Body Worn Camera (N=785)   
Wear a body camera  251 32% 
Vehicle-mounted camera  44 6% 
Both body and car cameras  55 7% 
No cameras of either type  435 55% 
 
Variables capturing age, race, education, marital status, and gender, measure personal 
characteristics and describe those traits originating with a specific person.  Table 3 contains an 
overview of the personal characteristic independent variables in this study.  The typical 
respondent has the personal traits of male (91%, n=715), white (72%, n=553), between 30-39 




Table 3: Descriptive Statistics—Personal Characteristics  
Independent Variables  Frequency (n)  Percentage  
Gender (N=789)   
Male 715 91% 
Female 70 9% 
Non-binary 4 .5% 
Age (N=789)   
20-29 38 5% 
30-39 306 39% 
40-49 278 35% 
50-over 167 21% 
Education (N=791)   
H.S. diploma 2 .3% 
H.S. diploma +credits 117 15% 
Associate  116 15% 
Baccalaureate 429 54% 
Master 119 15% 
Law degree 6 .8% 
Doctorate 2 .3% 
Family Status (N=792)   
Single, never married 116 15% 
Married 599 76% 
Married but separated 14 2% 
Divorced 56 7% 
Widowed 7 .9% 
Race (N=767)   
Black 49 6% 
White 553 72% 
Hispanic 98 13% 
Asian 44 6% 
American Indian 6 .8% 
Other 17 2% 
 
Correlations between independent variables  
“Correlation is a bivariate analysis that measures the strength of association between two 
variables and the direction of the relationship” (www.statisticssolutions.com).  This analysis uses 
Spearman’s Rho (rs)—a non-parametric test—to evaluate correlation because this dataset 




Rho an appropriate analysis over other correlations such as Pearson.4  Correlation results are 
summarized in Table 4.5   
“In an ordinal scale, the levels of a variable are ordered such that one level can be 
considered higher/lower than another.  However, the magnitude of the difference between levels 
is not necessarily known” (https://www.statisticssolutions.com/correlation-pearson-kendall-
spearman/).  Examples of ordinal levels for variables in this dataset are education, rank, and 
marital status where we know one category is higher or differentiated from another, but it is not 
immediate that each category classification has the same difference or interval of measure 
between them (https://www.statisticssolutions.com/correlation-pearson-kendall-spearman/).   
Monotonic is defined as, “having the property either of never increasing or never 
decreasing as the values of the independent variable or the subscripts of the terms increase” 
(www.merriam-webster.com).6 A Pearson r correlation is not appropriate for this dataset because 
Pearson is used to describe linear relationships, for normally distributed data that is 
homoscedastic.7   
When interpreting Spearman’s Rho, the coefficient can range between positive and 
negative one (-1 ≤ rs ≤ 1).
8  The closer Spearman’s Rho is to positive or negative one, the 
stronger the monotonic relationship.9  Very weak relationships will have an associated Rho of 
.00-.19, a moderate association is found at .40-.59, and a very strong relationship is .80-1.0.10 
                                                 
4 An explanation of the rules for using correlation in statistical analysis is provide by Statistics Solutions, 
Inc. and can be accessed at https://www.statisticssolutions.com/correlation-pearson-kendall-spearman/.  
5 Instructions and tutorials on computing and interpreting Spearman’s Correlation using STATA can be 
accessed at https://statistics/laerd.com/stata-tutorials/spearmans-correlation-using-stata.php.  
6 For a definition of monotonic, see https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/monotonic.   
7 See https://www.statisticssolutions.com/correlation-pearson-kendall-spearman/.   
8 A discussion on interpreting Spearman’s Rho is found at 
www.statstutor.ac.uk/resources/uploaded/spearmans.pdf.   
9 Ibid.  




Rank was weakly correlated to Assignment (rs=0.2388, p=0.000), Gender (rs=0.1378, 
p=0.0002), Age (rs=0.3033, p=0.000), Education (rs=-0.0919, p=0.0416), Family Status 
(rs=0.1293, p=0.0006), GendRace (rs=0.0910, p=0.0156), Role (rs=-0.0862, p=0.0221), and 
BWC (rs=0.2964, p=0.000). Assignment was weakly correlated to Age (rs=0.0847, p=0.0245), 
Tenure (rs=0.1716, p=0.000), Role (rs=0.0914, p=0.0151), and BWC (rs=0.2250, p=0.000).  
Gender was weakly correlated to Education (rs=-0.1359, p=0.0003) and Family Status 
(rs=0.0798, p=0.0342). Age was weakly correlated to Education (rs=-0.1195, p=0.0015), Family 
Status (rs=0.3047, p=0.000), Race (rs=-0.1052, p=0.0052), and BWC (rs=0.3617, p=0.000).  
Education was weakly correlated to Tenure (rs=-0.1179, p=0.0017), Race (rs=-0.0869, 
p=0.0210), GendRace (rs=-0.1366, p=0.0003), Role (rs=0.0741, p=0.0491), and BWC (rs=-
0.1278, p=0.0007). Tenure is weakly correlated to Family Status (rs=0.3073, p=0.000) and Race 
(rs=-0.0855, p=0.0233). Family Status was weakly correlated to BWC (rs=0.1340, p=0.000).   
Few variables were either moderately or strongly correlated. Rank was moderately 
correlated to Tenure (rs=0.4544, p=0.000). Age was strongly correlated to Tenure (rs=0.7941, 
p=0.000). Tenure was moderately correlated to BWC (rs=0.4079, p=0.000). As expected, Gender 
and Race were moderately (rs=0.5146, p=0.000) and highly (rs=0.8910, p=0.000) correlated to 
GendRace (respectively) as the latter was derived by combining the former.  
Multicollinearity  
This study’s six scenarios and other research questions modeled to examine teen 
enforcement, minority enforcement, defined role, and negative law enforcement news were 
examined for multicollinearity.  After each logistic regression, a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
was conducted using STATA command vif, uncentered.  A VIF of 10 or more is an indicator that 




which can skew coefficients, and impact the analysis (Williams, 2015, p. 5).  Across the models 
in this study, some of the subcategories had VIF values of 10 or more. However, removing them 
from the dataset would greatly impact the analytical value necessary to explain respondent 
membership in the binary dependent variable.  
Some remedies for multicollinearity involve removing the variables with VIF values of 
10 or more, then re-running the regression analysis and VIF testing, until the resulting model has 
VIF values for each independent value less than ten (Williams, 2015). Another option is to select 
a different analysis.  The University of California’s (UCLA) Institute for Digital Research and 
Education (2019) recognizes that the statistical model undergoing testing may require all 
independent variables for that model to remain.  This researcher takes UCLA’s position for this 
study and retained the independent variables in each model because Role Theory posits both 




Table 4: Spearman’s Correlation for Independent Variables  
 Rank Assign. Gender Age Educat Tenure FamStat Race GenRace Role BWC 
Rank 1.0           
            
Assign. 0.2388 1.0          
 0.000        Key   
Gender 0.1378 -0.0736 1.0      Rho (rs)   
 0.0002 0.0508       Sig. Level   
Age 0.3033 0.0847 0.0383 1.0        
 0.0000 0.0245 0.3099         
Educat -0.0919 0.0357 -0.1359 -0.1195 1.0       
 0.0146 0.3441 0.0003 0.0015        
Tenure 0.4544 0.1716 0.0443 0.7941 -0.1179 1.0      
 0.0000 0.0000 0.2396 0.0000 0.0017       
FamStat 0.1293 0.0222 0.0798 0.3047 -0.0625 0.3073 1.0     
 0.0006 0.5567 0.0342 0.0000 0.0973 0.0000      
Race 0.0330 -0.0100 0.0692 -0.1052 -0.0869 -0.0855 -0.0257 1.0    
 0.3822 0.7904 0.0661 0.0052 0.0210 0.0233 0.4962     
GenRace 0.0910 -0.0414 0.5146 -0.0731 -0.1366 -0.0535 0.0142 0.8910 1.0   
 0.0156 0.2719 0.0000 0.0523 0.0003 0.1556 0.7070 0.0000    
Role -0.0862 0.0914 -0.0443 -0.0187 0.0741 -0.0498 -0.0294 -0.0165 -0.0342 1.0  
 0.0221 0.0151 0.2400 0.6204 0.0491 0.1870 0.4357 0.6618 0.3644   
BWC 0.2964 0.2250 -0.0145 0.3617 -0.1278 0.4079 0.1340 -0.0109 -0.0161 -0.0439 1.0 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.7001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.7729 0.6693 0.2440  




Conceptual Model and Statistical Methods Overview  
 Since the dependent variable (i.e., outcome or response variable) is dichotomous, logistic 
regression is used to measure the relationship between the independent variables (i.e., predictor 
or explanatory variables) and the dependent variable.  Logistic regression is non-parametric, 
therefore it is not restricted by the same liner regression requirements of normal distribution or 
sample size.  Criteria for logistic regression mandate each independent variable have a minimum 
of 10 cases with an overall sample size equal to or greater than 100 cases (Fitzgerald & 
Fitzgerald, 2014).  
Ordinal logistic regression would have been appropriate if the dependent variable had a 
discrete order for membership. Multinomial logistic regression would have been appropriate if 
the dependent variable had three or more categories of no particular order. Neither of the 
aforementioned regression models are appropriate here. Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald (2014, p. 440) 
explain the logistic regression equation used for this analysis is Logit (Y)= A + B1X1 + B2X2 + 
B3X3 + B4X4 + B5X5 + … +error.  Logit (Y) represents the dependent variable. B1, B2, B3… each 
represent the average amount of change per independent variable (denoted by the subscript 
numbers for each BiXi combination).  STATA/MP 15.1, from StataCorp, was the statistical 
software package used to compute the equations in this analysis.  
Six scenarios were analyzed. The first three establish a baseline for law enforcement 
behavior, because they do not include challenges to the officer: 1) Low-level, quality of life 
offense, 2) Two adults fighting in the street, and 3) Car stop for a traffic infraction.  The next 
three scenarios include a non-physical challenge to the officer’s authority: 4) Street fight with 
public cell phone recording, 5) Two non-compliant protestors with verbal challenges to officer 




incident.  Respondents had the binary choice of either taking law enforcement action (coded as 
1) or not taking law enforcement action (coded as 0).  This is how discretion was measured in 
this study.  Each logistic regression underwent Estat classification sensitivity testing for 
goodness of model fit (www.stata.com).  After executing logistic regression commands for both 
the experimental models (i.e., containing both dependent and independent variables) and null 
models (i.e., using just the dependent variable), the Estat classification was executed to 
determine the predictive quality of the model for both the null model and experimental model.  
Although the literature varies on an appropriate threshold for improvement above the null, an 
improvement of 25% or more for the experimental model is considered sufficient.  Table 5 is a 
summary for all findings in this study. 
 
 
Table 5: Summary Table of Findings  
Scenario / Dep. Var.  Significant Independent Variables Overall (p) 
Question (Yes/No) Rank, Assign, Gender, Age, Educat., Tenure, Fam. Status, Race, Role Yes No 
S1. Low-level offense Enforcement Rank -- 0.2208 
S2. Street Fight Enforcement Rank and Tenure -- 0.2575 
S3. Car Stop Enforcement No predictors significant -- 0.7636 
S4. Cell phone Challenge Enforcement Rank and Family Status 0.0058 -- 
S5. Verbal Challenge  Enforcement Rank and Family Status 0.0443 -- 
S6. Passive Challenge Enforcement Rank, Assignment, and Education 0.0327 -- 
Q: Minorities Discretion No predictors significant -- 0.7117 
Q: Teenagers Enforcement Age and Tenure  -- 0.1367 
Q: Neg. Law Enf. News Affected Tenure -- 0.1972 
Q: Neg. Public Label Labeling Age, Family Status, and Race 0.0364 -- 
Q: Role in Public Safe Important Rank, Age, Tenure, Gender, and Role 0.0232 -- 
Intersectionality   Rank, Assign, Age, Educat., Tenure, Fam. Status, GendRace, Role   
S1. Low-level offense Enforcement Rank  -- 0.2079 
S2. Street Fight Enforcement Rank, Tenure, GenRace -- 0.1836 
S3. Car Stop Enforcement No predictors significant -- 0.6739 
S4. Cell phone challenge Enforcement Race and Family Status 0.0034 -- 
S5. Verbal Challenge  Enforcement Rank and Family Status  -- 0.0633 
S6. Passive Challenge Enforcement Rank, Assignment, and Education 0.0082 -- 
Q: Minorities Discretion No predictors significant -- 0.5211 
Q: Teenagers Enforcement Assignment, Age, and Tenure -- 0.0753 
Q: Neg. Law Enf. News Affected Tenure, Family Status, and GendRace -- 0.3363 
Q: Neg. Public Label Labeling Education  -- 0.1414 





Overview of Statistical Testing Results  
Table 6 provides an overview of all six scenarios.  The first three scenarios establish a 
baseline for law enforcement officers taking enforcement action, for essentially routine 
interactions with the public.  They are not statistically significant.  The last three scenarios 
incorporate a public challenge to the police officer. These models demonstrate statistical 
significance.  What follows is an overview of each scenario and its findings.   
Table 6: Synopsis of Logistic Regression Results—All Six Scenarios  






S1: Low-level Offense  594 38.91 (33) 0.2208 0.0486 58.95% 63.80% 
S2: Fighting in Street 595 38.93 (34) 0.2575 0.0600 76.32% 76.13% 
S3: Car Stop 594 27.82 (34) 0.7636 0.0339 54.25% 59.60% 
S4: Cell phone Challenge 589 57.07 (33) 0.0058 0.0728 62.22% 63.50% 
S5: Verbal Challenge  592 48.00 (33) 0.0443 0.0443 61.06% 64.36% 
S6: Passive Challenge  592 48.23 (32) 0.0327 0.0765 78.12% 77.53% 
 Note: Shaded scenarios are statistically significant.  
 Table 7 compares enforcement decision results for each scenario.  For low-level offenses 
(i.e., not requiring mandatory arrest) and fighting in the street, most law enforcement personnel 
would not take enforcement action. However, enforcement action is likely for a routine car stop.  
Challenging an officer with a cell phone recording would most likely not result in enforcement 
action.  However, enforcement action was likely when the public verbally challenged officers or 




Table 7: Enforcement Decision Results—All Six Scenarios  
Scenario  Would Take Enforcement 
Action (Yes) 
Would Not Take 
Enforcement Action (No) 
Frequency  Percentage Frequency  Percentage 
S1: Low-level Offense  257 41.05% 369 58.95% 
S2: Fighting in Street 148 23.68% 477 76.32% 
S3: Car Stop 338 54.25% 285 45.75% 
S4: Cell phone Challenge 235 37.78% 387 62.22% 
S5: Verbal Challenge  381 61.06% 243 38.94% 
S6: Passive Challenge  489 78.12% 137 21.88% 
 Note: Shaded cells denote the majority decision for each scenario.  
Scenario 1 Results  
Scenario 1 presented law enforcement officers with a low-level offense impacting 
residents’ quality-of-life (e.g., drinking in public, playing loud music, or similar infraction).  The 
offense may be correctable with enforcement action, by either an arrest or summons. The officer 
may also choose to exercise discretion, and not take any enforcement action. Table 8 details the 
statistically significant independent variables.  
Table 8: Scenario 1, Logistic Regression Results for Car Stop  
S1: Car Stop 
(N=594) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  2.1792 0.008 
Assignment   
Staff/Support .7699 0.274 
Training .5763 0.299 
Quality Control 1.4539 0.291 
Gender   
Male .8258 0.556 
Non-binary 1.3641 0.812 
Age   
30-39 1.1233 0.842 
40-59 1.4149 0.583 
50-over 1.1274 0.858 




High School Omitted  
H.S. +credits 1.2125 0.842 
AA/AS 1.7371 0.563 
BA/BA 1.5091 0.659 
MA/MS 2.037 0.453 
JD Omitted  
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 .8773 0.807 
11-15 .7133 0.542 
16-20 .4320 0.170 
21-25 .4052 0.159 
26-30 4688 0.288 
31-35 .4113 0.247 
36+ .2762 0.178 
Family Status   
Married .7864 0.398 
Separated .6009 0.521 
Divorced .8879 0.781 
Widowed .2623 0.282 
Race   
White .9906 0.980 
Hispanic 1.260 0.594 
Asian/PacIs 2.629 0.067 
AmerInd 2.629 0.067 
Other 2.988 0.107 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter 1.157 0.853 
Problem Solver 1.269 0.761 
First Responder 1.204 0.816 
Peacekeeper  1.049 0.954 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant.  
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 1 measured the likelihood (i.e., odds ratio) of 
taking enforcement action for a low-level offense, for predictor variables: rank, age, race, 
assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status.  Three hundred and sixty-nine (58.95%) 
did not take enforcement action and 257 (41.05%) did.  Supervisors are two times more likely to 




Officer’s responses for Scenario 1  
In Scenario 1 (N=626), 59% (n=369) elected not to take enforcement action.  For those 
officers not taking enforcement action, 34% (n=187) stated in their open-field responses they 
would: prefer to use discretion, act only if they were addressing a chronic condition, act if the 
person is willing to cease and desist, or would not take enforcement action for this scenario.  
Table 9 details the top answers respondents provided for not taking enforcement action.  See 
Appendix J for an overview of the types of reasons respondents supplied for each scenario.  
Table 9: Top Responses for No Enforcement (Scenario 1)  
Response Frequency Percentage 
Prefer discretion  187 34% 
Prefer warn and admonish  68 13% 
Anti-cop climate 53 8% 
Offense too petty  21 4% 
 
For Scenario 1, 41% elected to take enforcement action.  For those taking enforcement 
action 24% (n=133) responded they did so because: they receive a paycheck to enforce the law, 
need to discourage poor behavior, or doing nothing sends the wrong message.  Others stated 
enforcement was based on Broken Windows—the theory that enforcing lower-level offenses 
creates an inhospitable environment for more serious offending (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).  A 
remaining 15% (n=82) would take enforcement action, but qualified their choice by stating: “It 
depends on the circumstances, I would also consider discretion, or Use enforcement to correct 
negative behavior.”  
Scenario 2 Results  
 Scenario 2 involves two adults fighting in the street over the final score of a 




resolves this interaction.  No one is challenging or interfering with the officer.  The offense may 
be correctable with either an arrest or summons. The officer may also choose to exercise 
discretion, and not take any enforcement action.  Table 10 details the statistically significant 
independent variables.   
Table 10: Scenario 2, Logistic Regression Results for Fighting in the Street  
S2: Fighting  
(N=595) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  2.3481 0.018 
Assignment   
Staff/Support 1.0683 0.809 
Training 1.024 0.966 
Quality Control .9061 0.814 
Gender   
Male 1.2527 0.577 
Non-binary 3.4867 0.360 
Age   
30-39 2.4494 0.185 
40-59 3.3449 0.099 
50-over 2.7824 0.182 
Education   
H.S. +credits .38335 0.563 
AA/AS .8464 0.919 
BA/BA .5888 0.744 
MA/MS .5561 0.721 
JD 2.1430 0.677 
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 .5600 0.325 
11-15 years 0.2263 0.017 
16-20 years 0.1613 0.008 
21-25 years 0.1537 0.009 
26-30 .3128 0.139 
31-35 .1887 0.059 
36+ .1446 0.078 
Family Status   




Separated 2.7483 0.189 
Divorced 1.8969 0.182 
Widowed 1.4200 0.742 
Race   
White .4862 0.065 
Hispanic .6358 0.330 
Asian/PacIs 1.378 0.548 
AmerInd .4997 0.559 
Other .6624 0.570 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter .9674 0.970 
Problem Solver 1.147 0.876 
First Responder .9109 0.918 
Peacekeeper  1.8714 0.502 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 2 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement 
action for two adults fighting in the street, for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, 
gender, education, tenure, and family status.  Rank and tenure were statistically significant. For 
this scenario, 477 (76.32%) would not take enforcement action and 148 (23.68%) would take 
enforcement action.   
Supervisors are more than twice as likely to take enforcement action when dealing with a 
street fight than a non-supervisor (OR=2.3481, p=0.018).  Tenure was negatively associated with 
the decision to take enforcement action. Respondents with Tenure 11-15 years, are 77% less 
likely to take enforcement action (OR=0.2263, p=0.017) compared to the tenure category, New 
Hires-5 years (New Hires).  Tenure 16-20 years are 84% less likely to take enforcement action 
(OR=0.1613, p=0.008) compared to New Hires. Tenure 21-25 years are 85% less likely to take 
enforcement action (OR=0.1537, p=0.009) compared to New Hires.  From this, we can surmise 
that as a law enforcement officer’s career progresses, the likelihood of taking enforcement action 




Officer’s responses for Scenario 2  
In Scenario 2 (N=625), 76.3% (n=477) elected not to take enforcement action.  For those 
officers not taking enforcement action, 40% (n=224) stated in their open-field responses they did 
not consider a street fight the type of offense that would require enforcement.  Many respondents 
for this explanation stated they would, “Send them on their way.”  Thirty percent preferred to use 
discretion and not take enforcement action.  Many qualified their answers by stating enforcement 
action would be required if they were addressing a chronic condition, or if the combatants 
refused to cease and desist (see Appendix L).   
In Scenario 2, 23.7% (n=148) elected to take enforcement action.  For those taking 
enforcement action 16% (n=89) stated they are paid to enforce the law.  Additional reasons were: 
It’s my duty/job, I have to discourage poor behavior, or doing nothing sends the wrong message 
(see Appendix L, Table 26).  Eight percent (n=45) would take enforcement action, but qualified 
their choice by stating: “It depends on the circumstances, I would also consider discretion, or use 
enforcement to correct negative behavior.”  
Scenario 3 Results  
Scenario 3 involves a routine car stop for a traffic violation.  No one is challenging or 
interfering with the officer.  The offense may be correctable with either an arrest or summons. 
The officer may also choose to exercise discretion, and not take any enforcement action.  
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 3 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement 
action for a routine car stop for a traffic infraction, for predictor variables: rank, age, race, 
assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status.  This model was not statistically 
significant (p=0.7636). None of the predictor variables in this model were statistically 




Table 11: Scenario 3, Logistic Regression Results for Car Stop 
S3: Car Stop  
(N=594) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  1.0844 0.762 
Assignment   
Staff/Support .9854 0.949 
Training 1.3740 0.514 
Quality Control 1.2695 0.506 
Gender   
Male .8393 0.586 
Non-binary 1.156 0.912 
Age   
30-39 .8657 0.802 
40-59 1.3012 0.673 
50-over 1.5200 0.523 
Education   
H.S. +credits .7946 0.885 
AA/AS 1.3358 0.855 
BA/BA 1.0670 0.967 
MA/MS .8642 0.926 
JD .4248 0.634 
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 1.4463 0.480 
11-15 years 1.4986 0.451 
16-20 years .9870 0.982 
21-25 years 1.0180 0.977 
26-30 .8607 0.828 
31-35 .6202 0.516 
36+ .5396 0.481 
Family Status   
Married .9475 0.850 
Separated 1.5033 0.605 
Divorced 1.0705 0.872 
Widowed .7315 1.736 
Race   
White .6971 0.326 
Hispanic 1.2341 0.630 




AmerInd .4591 0.416 
Other 1.6451 0.478 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter .6120 0.519 
Problem Solver .8653 0.848 
First Responder .7778 0.745 
Peacekeeper  1.0675 0.932 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
Officer’s responses for Scenario 3 
In Scenario 3 (N=623), 54% (n=338) elected to take enforcement action.  For those 
officers taking enforcement action, 28% (n=153) stated in their open-field responses they acted 
out of a narrower interpretation of their responsibilities (e.g., their duty, it’s the law, or people 
are responsible for their actions).  Additionally, 25% of respondents (n=137) taking enforcement 
action, qualified their behavior with statements that they would be amenable to exercising 
discretion and the actions of the civilian drive the action of the officer (e.g., a confrontational 
public would reduce the probability of extending discretion).  An explanation repeated in many 
of the responses was (in effect), “If I have to pull you over, you’re getting a ticket.”  
In Scenario 3, 46% (n=285) elected not to take enforcement action.  For those not taking 
enforcement action, 30% (n=162) stated they would use discretion.  Influencing their decision 
were either the actions of the motorist or whether the officer is addressing a chronic condition.  
Six percent (n=34) not taking enforcement action would only warn or admonish the motorist.  
Scenario 4 Results  
Scenario 4 involves two adults fighting in the street except this time, bystanders 
challenge the officer by recording the interaction on their cell phones.  No one is physically 
interfering with the officer.  The offense may be correctable with either an arrest or summons. 




Table 12: Scenario 4, Logistic Regression Results for Cell Phone Challenge  
S4: Cell Phone 
Challenge  (N=589) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  2.9705 0.000 
Assignment   
Staff/Support 1.0942 0.707 
Training 2.0113 0.167 
Quality Control 1.0418 0.910 
Gender   
Male 1.1965 0.605 
Non-binary Omitted  
Age   
30-39 2.3975 0.229 
40-59 3.1565 0.134 
50-over 1.9734 0.397 
Education   
H.S. +credits .1852 0.293 
AA/AS .4490 0.616 
BA/BA .3034 0.450 
MA/MS .4963 0.660 
JD .2482 0.442 
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 1.2359 0.729 
11-15 years .8039 0.729 
16-20 years .4634 0.259 
21-25 years .3818 0.174 
26-30 .5907 0.499 
31-35 .4213 0.306 
36+ .5166 0.505 
Family Status   
Married .9613 0.896 
Separated .4126 0.314 
Divorced 2.8374 0.018 
Widowed 1.0716 0.949 
Race   
White 1.4857 0.310 
Hispanic 2.2498 0.074 




AmerInd 1.3057 0.784 
Other 1.0918 0.903 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter 2.5336 0.291 
Problem Solver 2.0536 0.412 
First Responder 2.0385 0.424 
Peacekeeper  1.7943 0.528 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 4 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement 
action for a street fight while the officer was recorded by civilians’ cell phones, for predictor 
variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status.  This model 
is statistically significant (p=0.0058).  Rank and Family Status were significant predictor 
variables.   
In Scenario 4, 62% of respondents stated they would not take enforcement action in this 
scenario (compared to 38% that would).  Supervisors are more than twice as likely to take 
enforcement action when cell phone recorded, while handling a street fight (OR=2.9705, 
p=0.000) compared to non-supervisors.  Divorced officers are more than twice as likely to take 
enforcement action in this scenario (OR=2.8374, p=0.018) compared to Single, Never Married.   
Officer’s responses for Scenario 4  
 In Scenario 4 (N=622), 62% (n=387) elected not to take enforcement action.  For those 
officers not taking enforcement action, the highest returned open-field responses/explanations 
was 22% (n=120) stating they would use discretion and be guided by the demeanor or actions of 
the civilians involved.  Table 13 captures the top responses for not taking enforcement in 





Table 13: Top Responses for No Enforcement (Scenario 4) 
Response: No Enforcement  Frequency Percentage 
Prefer discretion, public demeanor 120 22% 
Recordings don’t influence LE decision  100 18% 
No serious offense, no enforcement needed 77 14% 
Current climate jeopardizes one’s career 12 2% 
 
For Scenario 4, 38% (n=235) chose to take enforcement action.  Of those providing 
written responses, the highest frequency response at 11% (n=62) stated they would take 
enforcement action expressly because they were recorded.  In this group of responses, officers 
stated enforcement action would justify their public interaction (i.e., stopping the subject), if later 
challenged by their respective civilian complaint/disciplinary boards.  See Table 14 for the top 
responses explaining why respondents took action in Scenario 4.  
Table 14: Top Responses for Taking Enforcement Action (Scenario 4)  
Response: Enforcement Action Frequency Percentage 
Recording triggers enforcement  62 11% 
They’re paid to enforce the law  61 11% 
Would take action, but open to discretion 43 8% 
Recording means nothing, take enforcement action 34 6% 
 
Scenario 5 Results 
 Scenario 5 involves an act of civil disobedience (a low-level offense) at a demonstration. 
Most of the public comply with the officer’s instructions to keep the walkway clear for 
pedestrians, but two people verbally challenge the officer by attacking the officer’s legitimacy to 
tell civilians what to do at a demonstration.  The officers are not recorded and no one is 




aloud the officer’s name and badge number from their uniform and states “cops have no business 
or authority over a free people.”  This is a verbal challenge to the officer. Table 15 outlines the 
statistically significant independent variables in this model.  
Table 15: Scenario 5, Logistic Regression Results for Verbal Challenge 
S5: Verbal Challenge  
(N=592) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  1.9936 0.012 
Assignment   
Staff/Support .7585 0.244 
Training 1.3916 0.525 
Quality Control .8952 0.760 
Gender   
Male .8301 0.587 
Non-binary .4608 0.610 
Age   
30-39 2.1586 0.216 
40-59 2.0947 0.268 
50-over 2.1052 0.288 
Education   
High School Omitted  
H.S. +credits 8.5147 0.069 
AA/AS 8.7695 0.064 
BA/BA 8.7374 0.060 
MA/MS 6.1429 0.119 
JD Omitted  
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 .5494 0.281 
11-15 years .6434 0.439 
16-20 years .6381 0.470 
21-25 years .6923 0.573 
26-30 .3052 0.099 
31-35 .5036 0.369 
36+ .4367 0.356 
Family Status   
Married 0.4426 0.011 




Divorced 1.056 0.910 
Widowed .2305 0.138 
Race   
White 1.5542 0.242 
Hispanic 2.064 0.110 
Asian/PacIs 1.009 0.986 
AmerInd .4731 0.445 
Other 2.257 0.263 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter .5558 0.502 
Problem Solver .5170 0.448 
First Responder .4446 0.359 
Peacekeeper  .5315 0.488 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
 
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 5 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement 
action for civil disobedience during a demonstration, for predictor variables: rank, age, race, 
assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status.  In this scenario, protestors verbally 
challenged the authority and legitimacy of the officers.  No recordings occurred.  Scenario 5 is 
statistically significant (p=0.0443).  Rank and Family Status were significant predictor variables.  
Rank had a positive relationship to enforcement whereas Family Status had a negative 
relationship for married officers.   
In Scenario 5, 61% of respondents stated they would take enforcement action in this 
scenario (compared to 39% that would not).  Supervisors are more likely to take enforcement 
action (OR=1.9936, p=0.012) when challenged during an act of civil disobedience (p=0.012), 
compared to non-supervisors.  Married officers are 56% less likely to take enforcement action 
(OR=0.4426, p=0.011), compared to Single, Never Married officers.  
Officer’s responses for Scenario 5  
In this scenario of 624 respondents, 61% (n=381) elected to take enforcement action.  Of 




of duty or professional obligation; 25% (n=136) also opted for enforcement action but remain 
amenable to discretion, if the circumstances warrant.   
In Scenario 5, 39% (n=243) chose not to take enforcement action.  Of those not choosing 
enforcement action 22% percent (n=121) stated they would rather exercise discretion.  Eight 
percent (n=42) felt the offense did not rise to a serious enough level to warrant enforcement in 
this scenario, with many officers electing to “send them on their way.”  Six percent (n=32) would 
not take action due to the current political and social climate, which can place one’s career in 
jeopardy (see Appendix J).  
Scenario 6 Results  
This scenario is a routine car stop for a traffic violation.  The motorist takes exception to 
the officer’s actions and states the stop was predicated on profiling and discrimination.  No one 
is physically interfering with the officer.  Bystanders observe the verbal exchange between the 
motorist and the officer.  Onlookers are manually documenting (i.e., writing down) the street 
name, police radio car number, and other particulars about the stop.  No one is electronically 
recording you.  One onlooker says, “Try to get his name and badge number too.  We may need it 
later.”  The offense may be correctable with either an arrest or summons. The officer may also 
choose to exercise discretion, and not take any enforcement action.  This is a passive challenge to 




Table 16: Scenario 6, Logistic Regression Results for Passive Challenge  
S6: Passive Challenge  
(N=592) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank    
Supervisor  2.0685 0.016 
Assignment   
Staff/Support 1.3058 0.363 
Training .49575 0.174 
Quality Control 4.1328 0.029 
Gender   
Male .8178 0.623 
Non-binary Omitted  
Age   
30-39 2.8992 0.106 
40-59 3.0534 0.123 
50-over 2.4810 0.230 
Education   
High School Omitted  
HS + credits  9.6941 0.024 
AA/AS 11.8220 0.014 
BA/BS 8.7859 0.024 
MA/MS 8.7960 0.027 
JD Omitted  
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 .4735 0.226 
11-15 years .8394 0.787 
16-20 years .3466 0.133 
21-25 years 6929 0.625 
26-30 .4102 0.272 
31-35 .4635 0.374 
36+ .3632 0.310 
Family Status   
Married .7695 0.464 
Separated .9399 0.947 
Divorced 1.1895 0.749 
Widowed .4828 0.489 
Race   
White 1.4584 0.355 




Asian/PacIs 1.0126 0.984 
AmerInd .6995 0.718 
Other 1.0846 0.910 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter 1.0035 0.997 
Problem Solver 1.0221 0.979 
First Responder 1.576 0.601 
Peacekeeper  .8395 0.844 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
 
Logistic regression testing for Scenario 6 measured the likelihood of taking enforcement 
action during a routine car stop with passive confrontation, which included civilians making a 
written record of the police-person interaction, for predictor variables: rank, age, race, 
assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status.  This model is statistically significant 
(Obs.=592, LR X2(32)=48.23, p=0.0327, Pseudo R2=0.0765).  Rank, Assignment, and Education 
were significant and positively related to the predictor variable Enforcement.   
In Scenario 6, 78% of respondents stated they would take enforcement action in this 
scenario (compared to 22% that would not). Supervisors are more likely to take enforcement 
action when passively challenged during a traffic stop (OR=2.0685, p=0.016) compared to non-
supervisors.   
Officers assigned to Quality Control/Internal Affairs are more likely to take enforcement 
action in Scenario 6 (OR=4.1328, p=0.029) compared to officers with patrol/field assignments.  
High School graduates with some college credits are more likely to take enforcement action 
(OR=9.6941, p=0.024) compared to high school only graduates.  Officers with Associate degrees 
are 11.8 times more likely to take enforcement action (OR=11.8220, p=0.014) compared to high 
school only graduates.  Baccalaureate degree recipients are more likely to take enforcement 




are more likely to take enforcement action (OR=8.7960, p=0.027) compared to high school only 
graduates. 
Officer’s responses for Scenario 6  
In this scenario (N=626), 78% (n=489) elected to take enforcement action.  Of those 
taking action, and willing to provide an explanation of their decision, 42% (n=227) stated they 
took enforcement action out of a sense of duty or professional obligation.  In Scenario 6, 28% 
(n=151) stated because their interaction with the public was “expressly noted” (i.e., documented 
or recorded), the officer elected to take enforcement action or felt the need to protect themselves 
and justify the public interaction, if later challenged by civilian review boards.  Another eight 
percent (n=43) stated they would take enforcement action, but were willing to consider 
discretion, based on the demeanor of the civilian, or if the circumstances warranted discretion.   
In Scenario 6, 22% (n=137) chose not to take enforcement action.  Of those not taking 
action, and willing to provide an explanation of their decision, 12% (n=66) stated they would 
rather exercise discretion, but may feel differently if addressing a chronic condition, or if the 
person was cooperative with police.  
Discretion with Minorities and Teenagers  
Instead of asking whether police would take enforcement action against minorities, the 
dichotomous choices were changed to ascertain whether officers were more likely or less likely 
to extend discretion.  Rewording the dependent variable was necessary since discussing 
enforcement on minorities triggered varying levels of sensitivity and concern in respondents.   
Early in this study’s design phase, the survey instrument was tested.  Initial survey 
feedback from respondents expressed trepidation over taking enforcement action against 




(essentially “cutting the person a break”). Table 17 reports the results for these two survey 
questions.  Neither model is statistically significant.  
Table 17: Results of Discretionary Decision-making Analysis  




Discretion and Minorities  425 27.13 (32) 0.7117 0.0491 64.60% 65.41% 
Discretion and Teenagers  556 41.94 (33) 0.1367 0.0544 50.68% 61.15% 
 
Discretion and the Minority Community  
Logistic regression measured the likelihood of extending discretion to members of a 
racial/ethnic minority group.  The bivariate choice of more likely or less likely to extend 
discretion, was measured for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, 
tenure, and family status.  This model is not statistically significant (Obs.=425, LR 
X2(32)=27.13, p=0.7117, Pseudo R2=0.0491).  None of the predictor variables in this model were 
significant.  Estat testing demonstrates a correct classification rate of 65.41%, which improved 
upon the null model of 64.60% by 0.81%, as a predictive model for testing officer discretion of 
minority clients. 
Officer’s responses for minority discretion  
When interacting with the minority community, 65% (n=292) of respondents are more 
likely to use discretion.  Table 18 outlines the results of significance testing for minority 
discretion. Table 19 notes the most returned responses for enforcement when interacting with 




Table 18: Logistic Regression Results for Minority Discretion  
Minority Discretion 
(N=425) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  1.0919 0.796 
Assignment   
Staff/Support 1.6862 0.105 
Training 1.3851 0.562 
Quality Control .9073 0.807 
Gender   
Male .9544 0.912 
Non-binary Omitted  
Age   
30-39 .8017 0.736 
40-59 .6779 0.592 
50-over .7139 0.660 
Education   
H.S. +credits 4.2224 0.387 
AA/AS 3.6517 0.437 
BA/BA 5.0499 0.324 
MA/MS 5.2305 0.319 
JD Omitted  
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 .6527 0.495 
11-15 years .7678 0.680 
16-20 years .6801 0.593 
21-25 years .6726 0.600 
26-30 1.4819 0.653 
31-35 1.1263 0.895 
36+ 2.6266 0.467 
Family Status   
Married 1.7467 0.089 
Separated 2.1101 0.441 
Divorced 1.9562 0.189 
Widowed 5.1571 0.243 
Race   
White 1.5514 0.304 
Hispanic 1.0738 0.888 




AmerInd 3.9534 0.263 
Other 1.2195 0.800 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter 2.2521 0.451 
Problem Solver 3.1928 0.280 
First Responder 1.8490 0.572 
Peacekeeper  3.6789 0.248 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
 
Table 19: Responses Against Using Enforcement on Minority Members of the Public 
Officer’s Response Frequency Percentage 
More likely to use discretion, stated they treat everyone 
the same, race did not matter to the officer, or they 
always remain objective 
118 23% 
Would use discretion because they do not want to be 
judged racist, enforcement would look bad on social 
media, expressed fear of scapegoating by their 
department/municipal government, or wanted to avoid 
confrontation 
38 7% 
Would need to judge the severity/gravity and totality of 
the circumstances of each incident 
23 4% 
.  
For the question of enforcement on members of the minority community, 35% (n=160) 
were less likely to use discretion.  Table 20 notes the most returned responses for taking 




Table 20: Responses from Officers Using Enforcement on Minority Members of the Public 
Officer’s Response Frequency Percentage 
Stated they treat everyone the same, or remain uninfluenced 
by one’s race 
100 19% 
Felt less likely to extend discretion to minorities but were 
willing to consider the severity/gravity and totality of 
circumstances in each incident. 
18 4% 
 
Unlike the vignettes used in the six scenarios for this survey, the issue of minorities and 
law enforcement discretion generated the most negative feedback from respondents (in the open 
comments area) for this specific question.  Appendix L reports the answer categories returned for 
the question of minorities and enforcement.  The question was considered offensive by 38% of 
respondents (n=168) with written feedback that included the phrases: offensive or objectionable. 
Some respondents retorted with nonsensical or inappropriate comments to the researcher, or 
expressed indifference to the purpose of this question.  This was the highest number of “protest” 
comments, returned in this survey.  Some departments did not participate in this study because of 
the potential sensitivity over this question and how their officers might answer it.  
Sensitivity to discussing discretion and enforcement in minority communities, impacted 
convenience sampling efforts.  One relatively sizable department in a mid-western state refused 
to administer the survey to their personnel unless the question on minority discretion was 
removed.  Another department, located on the west coast, questioned whether a binary choice 
was an appropriately objective option for their officers.  They too declined to participate.  
Neither agency was dissuaded, even when this researcher’s explained that respondents had the 




Discretion and Teenagers  
Respondents (N=586) were asked, whether they were more likely or less likely to take 
enforcement action when interacting with teenagers in enforcement scenarios (for low-level 
misdemeanor or petty offenses).  For this question, 51% (n=297) are unlikely to take 
enforcement action when interacting with teenagers.   
Logistic regression measured the likelihood of taking enforcement action against teenage 
offenders.  The bivariate choice of more likely or less likely to take enforcement action, was 
measured for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and 
family status.  This model is not statistically significant (Obs.=556, LR X2(33)=41.94, p=0.1367, 
Pseudo R2=0.0544).  Estat testing demonstrates a correct classification rate of 61.15% compared 
to 50.68% for the null model. This is an improvement of 10.47% on the null, as a predictive 
model.   
Table 21:Logistic Regression Results for Teens and Enforcement 
Teenagers and Enforce. 
(N=556) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  1.3305 0.307 
Assignment   
Staff/Support 1.2673 0.325 
Training 1.1717 0.742 
Quality Control 2.6104 0.013 
Gender   
Male 1.5252 0.219 
Non-binary 2.5216 0.539 
Age   
30-39 4.7012 0.025 
40-59 9.0488 0.003 
50-over 7.0621 0.011 
Education   
H.S. +credits 5.3181 0.149 




BA/BA 5.7647 0.122 
MA/MS 5.5176 0.136 
JD Omitted  
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 .4117 0.132 
11-15 years .3599 0.088 
16-20 years .1844 0.010 
21-25 years .2623 0.0550 
26-30 .2658 0.079 
31-35 .1683 0.026 
36+ .6304 0.633 
Family Status   
Married 1.1274 0.682 
Separated 1.4433 0.650 
Divorced 1.5650 0.313 
Widowed .7111 0.746 
Race   
White .8562 0.671 
Hispanic 1.4926 0.357 
Asian/PacIs 1.8789 0.245 
AmerInd .94317 0.949 
Other 1.0736 0.914 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter .8061 0.822 
Problem Solver .6845 0.692 
First Responder .6332 0.638 
Peacekeeper  .6205 0.634 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
 
The independent variables Age and Tenure were significant in this model.  Age had a 
positive relationship for the likelihood of taking enforcement action.  Age group 30-39 were 
more likely to take enforcement action (OR=4.7012, p=0.025) against teenagers, compared to 
Age group 20-29 (the baseline group).  Age group 40-49 were nine times more likely to take 




Group 50-over were seven times more likely to take enforcement action (OR=7.0621, p=0.011) 
against teenagers, compared to Age group 20-29.   
The variable Tenure had a negative relationship to taking enforcement action.  Officers 
with 16-20 years of service were 82% less likely to take enforcement action against teenagers 
compared to the baseline group of Newly Hired officers (OR=0.1844, p=0.010). Tenure 21-25 
were 74% less likely to take enforcement action, compared to Newly Hired officers (OR=0.2623, 
p=0.050). Tenure 31-35 are 83% less likely to take enforcement action, compared to Newly 
Hired officers (OR=0.1683, p=0.026).  
Officer’s responses for enforcement on teenagers  
To explain their choices, 28% (n=136) stated they would not take enforcement action 
against a teenager because juveniles are either more problematic to arrest, require greater latitude 
due to their age, use the opportunity as a teaching moment, or there was no need to ruin their 
lives with a criminal record. Five percent (n=23) also stated they would not take enforcement 
action against a teenager but would need to consider the person’s demeanor, attitude, or maturity 
in their decision. Five percent (n=21) would not take enforcement action because they consider 
enforcement action against teenagers either a waste of time, provides no political or department 
support to an officer if there is a negative result, or the officer provided an apathetic response. 
Appendix K demonstrates the answer categories returned for the question of teenagers and 
enforcement.   
For this question on teenagers and discretion, 49% (n=289) were likely to take 
enforcement action.  Of those taking enforcement action against teenagers, 20% (n=98) stated 
age does not make a difference, the law is the law.  Another 14% (n=69) felt enforcement action 




percent (n=38) would take enforcement action against a teen but would also consider the teen’s 
demeanor, mitigating circumstances, or the level of respect offered by the youth.  
Influence of Media Messaging, Labeling, and Role on Law Enforcement Behavior  
The remaining survey questions asked respondents how negative law enforcement news 
impacts them, where they get this news, what they do with this negative news/information, 
whether negative labeling exist, and whether they feel they play an important role in public 
safety.  See Table 22 for an overview of the logistic regression results for these areas.  
Table 22: Results of Analyses on the Importance of News, Labeling, and Role  
Influencer on Police 
Behavior  






Neg. Law Enf. News  551 37.45 (31) 0.1972 0.0998 89.62% 89.84% 
Neg. Public Labeling  710 42.80 (28) 0.0364 0.1319 94.42% 93.94% 
Role Importance   667 44.78 (28) 0.0232 0.1338 93.81% 93.55% 
Note: Shaded models are statistically significant.  
Impact of Media Reporting on Law Enforcement Behavior  
Logistic regression testing examined the impact negative news has on law enforcement.  
The bivariate output (i.e., Yes or No) gauged whether officers were impacted by negative news, 
for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status.  
This model is not statistically significant (Obs.=551, LR X2(31)=37.45, p=0.1972, Pseudo 
R2=0.0998).  Estat testing demonstrates a correct classification rate of 89.84%, which improves 
upon the null model of 89.62%.  Tenure was significant and positively related to the dependent 




Table 23: Logistic Regression Results for Impact of Negative Law Enforcement News 
Neg. LE News 
(N=551) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  .5391 0.222 
Assignment   
Staff/Support .9886 0.976 
Training Omitted  
Quality Control 2.0605 0.355 
Gender   
Male .2734 0.105 
Non-binary Omitted  
Age   
30-39 .3063 0.287 
40-59 .2551 0.244 
50-over .2447 0.240 
Education   
H.S. +credits 4.7165 0.405 
AA/AS 4.3030 0.431 
BA/BA 3.9538 0.446 
MA/MS 1.4896 0.826 
JD Omitted  
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 3.1736 0.174 
11-15 years 5.7077 0.041 
16-20 years 5.8111 0.062 
21-25 years 5.9919 0.071 
26-30 3.6731 0.224 
31-35 3.3674 0.280 
36+ 10.740 0.114 
Family Status   
Married .8098 0.688 
Separated .1761 0.072 
Divorced .5947 0.469 
Widowed .2353 0.237 
Race   
White 1.7291 0.327 
Hispanic 2.1256 0.295 




AmerInd .2952 0.269 
Other .6875 0.665 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter 2.8142 0.268 
Problem Solver 2.2175 0.386 
First Responder 2.5097 0.338 
Peacekeeper  2.0977 0.467 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
 
For the question on media reporting, 544 respondents (89.62%) stated they were affected 
by negative law enforcement news (our baseline response for this dependent variable), even if 
that agency/municipality is geographically located far from their own, compared to 63 (10.38%) 
who stated they were not affected (i.e., responded with No).  Officers in the Tenure group 11-15 
years of service, are five times more likely to be affected by negative law enforcement news 
(OR=5.7077, p=0.041), compared to Newly Hired (the baseline group for Tenure).   
Where Does Law Enforcement Gets their News?  
As a follow-up question to whether officers are affected by negative news reports on law 
enforcement related topics, respondents were asked to identify where they get their news 
(N=607).  Most law enforcement personnel in this study stated they get their information from 
broadcast media (59.9%).  Table 24 is an overview of news sources for law enforcement in this 




Table 24: Results for Sources of Law Enforcement News  
Sources of Law Enforcement News (N=607) Frequency Percentage 
Broadcast Media  364 59.9% 
Social Media  143 23.6% 
Peers 46 7.6% 
Labor Unions 34 5.6% 
Police Leaders 20 3.3% 
TOTAL 607 100% 
 
When asked how negative law enforcement news made them feel, 40% (n=246) selected 
from the prefix responses stating they continued to do their job as they have always done.  Table 
25 notes the major responses for the question about their feelings/responses to negative law 
enforcement news.  
Table 25: Responses to Law Enforcement News Stories 
Officer’s Written Responses Frequency Percentage 
Will continue to do their job as they have always done 246 40% 
Made them feel as if law enforcement was unfairly maligned 
and mischaracterized in the news  
217 36% 
Negative news caused them to be more cognizant of their own 
personal safety while on patrol and more tactically alert  
87 14% 
 
Public Labeling and Law Enforcement Behavior  
Respondents (N=789) were asked whether they believe the public placed negative labels 
on law enforcement.  In response to public labeling, 94% (n=745) stated they believed the public 
negatively labeled law enforcement officers.  Six percent (n=44) felt the public did not 




Logistic regression tested perceived negative public labeling as a bivariate choice (i.e., 
Yes or No), for predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and 
family status.  This model is statistically significant (Obs.=710, LR X2(28)=42.80, p=0.0364, 
Pseudo R2=0.1319).  Estat testing demonstrated a correct classification rate of 93.94% but it did 
not improve upon the null model of 94.42%.  Age (positively related) and Family Status 
(negatively related) were statistically significant.  Race was marginally significant.  
Table 26:  Logistic Regression Results for Negative Public Labeling of Law Enforcement 
Labeling 
(N=710) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  1.0790 0.884 
Assignment   
Staff/Support .87720 0.776 
Training 1.2898 0.818 
Quality Control 2.3591 0.420 
Gender   
Male .4040 0.250 
Non-binary .0957 0.120 
Age   
30-39 6.6673 0.014 
40-59 1.7530 0.500 
50-over 1.5226 0.641 
Education   
H.S. +credits 2.7937 0.122 
AA/AS 3.5113 0.076 
BA/BA 1.5732 0.284 
MA/MS Omitted  
JD Omitted  
PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 .8741 0.859 
11-15 years 1.8549 0.467 
16-20 years 2.1015 0.426 
21-25 years 4.0991 0.160 




31-35 3.9050 0.273 
36+ Omitted  
Family Status   
Married .7223 0.544 
Separated .1427 0.042 
Divorced .3252 0.125 
Widowed Omitted  
Race   
White 2.7876 0.051 
Hispanic 2.3464 0.217 
Asian/PacIs 7.0364 0.113 
AmerInd Omitted  
Other 1.7081 0.585 
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter 1.0864 0.893 
Problem Solver 1.0173 0.976 
First Responder 1.0999 0.885 
Peacekeeper  Omitted  
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
 
For the variable Age, respondents in category 30-39 were six times more likely to feel the 
public negatively labels law enforcement officers (OR=6.6673, p=0.014), compared to age 
category 20-29 (the baseline for this variable).   
For the variable Family Status, respondents in the Separated category were 86% less 
likely to perceive that the public negatively labeled law enforcement officers (OR=0.1427, 
p=0.042), compared to Single, Never Married officers (the baseline for this variable).   
For the variable Race, Whites were twice as likely to feel the public negatively labeled 
law enforcement (OR=2.7876, p=0.051) compared to Blacks (the baseline for this variable).  
This was marginally significant because the resulting probability was slightly above the 




Examining Role Importance  
Respondents (N=791) were asked whether they believed they played an important role in 
public safety and maintaining social order.  For the question on their role in policing, 94% 
(n=742) stated they believed they played an important role in public safety and social order. Six 
percent (n=49) believed they did not.  
Logistic regression tested role importance as a bivariate choice (i.e., Yes or No), for 
predictor variables: rank, age, race, assignment, gender, education, tenure, and family status.  
This model is statistically significant (Obs.=667, LR X2(28)=44.78, p=0.0232, Pseudo 
R2=0.1338).  Estat testing demonstrated a correct classification rate of 93.55%, which did not 
improve upon the null model of 93.81%.   
Table 27: Plays an Important Role in Public Safety and Order 
Role in Public Safety 
(N=667) 
Odds Ratio  Prob.  
Rank   
Supervisor  2.7554 0.029 
Assignment   
Staff/Support .6276 0.222 
Training .4471 0.333 
Quality Control 1.8958 0.545 
Gender   
Male .9819 0.977 
Non-binary .0181 0.051 
Age   
30-39 13.8251 0.080 
40-59 26.3555 0.040 
50-over 79.0111 0.009 
Education   
H.S. +credits .9901 0.986 
AA/AS .8987 0.852 
BA/BA 1.2668 0.626 
MA/MS Omitted  




PhD/EdD Omitted  
Tenure   
6-10 .2434 0.328 
11-15 years .0270 0.041 
16-20 years .0096 0.011 
21-25 years .0084 0.011 
26-30 .0037 0.004 
31-35 .0116 0.038 
36+ Omitted  
Family Status   
Married .4459 0.262 
Separated Omitted  
Divorced 2.3402 0.498 
Widowed Omitted  
Race   
White .6997 0.649 
Hispanic 1.6277 0.621 
Asian/PacIs Omitted  
AmerInd .4467 0.561 
Other Omitted  
Defined Role   
Crime Fighter 3.8544 0.161 
Problem Solver 3.5590 0.178 
First Responder 7.0724 0.059 
Peacekeeper  5.7346 0.119 
Note: Shaded independent variable categories are statistically significant. 
Rank was significant and positively related to the respondent feeling that they played an 
important role in public safety.  Supervisors were two times more likely to feel they played an 
important role (OR=2.7554, p=0.029), compared to non-supervisors.   
Age was significant and positively related to respondents who felt they play a role.  Age 
group 40-49 were 26.3 times more likely to feel they play an important role (OR=26.3555, 
p=0.040) compared to age group 20-29 (the baseline for this category).  Age group 50-over were 
79 times more likely to feel they play an important role (OR=79.0111, p=0.009) compared to 




Tenure was significant and negatively related to the dependent variable. Officers with 11-
15 years of service were 97% less like to feel they played a role (OR=0.0270, p=0.041), 
compared to the tenure category Newly hired-5 years (the baseline category for this variable).  
Officers with 16-20 years of service are 99% less like to feel they play a role (OR=0.0096, 
p=0.011), compared to Newly Hired-5 years.  Officers with 21-25 years of service are 99.2% less 
like to feel they play a role (OR=0.0841, p=0.011), compared to Newly Hired-5 years.  Officers 
with 26-30 years of service are 99.7% less like to feel they play a role (OR=0.0037, p=0.004), 
compared to Newly Hired-5 years.  Officers with 31-35 years of service are 99% less like to feel 
they play a role (OR=0.0116, p=0.038), compared to Newly Hired-5 years.   
Variables Gender and Defined Role were marginally significant, since they were slightly 
outside the 95% probability threshold for statistical testing.   Non-binary respondents in the 
variable Gender were 99% less likely to feel they played a role in maintaining public safety and 
order (OR=0.0181, p=0.051), compared to Females (the baseline for this variable).   
Respondents classifying their role as First Responder, for the variable Defined Role were 
seven times more likely to feel they played an important public safety role (OR=7.0724, 
p=0.059), compared to those identifying as Safety Expert (the baseline for this variable).   
Options for Statistical Testing: Path Analysis  
In designing this study, one of the initial conceptual models for statistical analysis was 
going to examine whether the use of body worn cameras (BWC) had an impact (as a mediating 
variable) on officers’ enforcement decisions.  Path analysis was chosen because it often 
complements logistic regression.  Path analysis would have been appropriate if all independent 
variables for the model were all correlated to each other. For this dataset, they are not (Table 4).  




Examining body camera footage as a mediating variable, in an environment where public 
cell phone recording is highly probable, could help with understanding whether law enforcement 
officers see BWCs as a way for them to provide or capture a more objective narrative.  BWCs 
are government property, subject to discovery in court and FOIL requests by other interested 
parties (i.e., private citizens, institutions, anyone with interest in the footage).  FOIL requests are 
subject to redactions, editing, or a government agency’s refusal to comply, if the footage 
contained material subject to exclusion provisions (such as the identity of sex crime victims, 
juveniles, employee personal information, etc.).11  In comparison, cell phone video is capable of 
real-time streaming on social media.  
Constructing path analysis in STATA  
Using the graphical user interface (GUI) modeling feature in STATA, the path analysis 
model and equations are drafted directly onscreen, with the user not having to enter syntax to run 
statistical testing, as the software runs the computations behind the GUI display.  See Figure 2 
for the path model initially conceived for this analysis.  
                                                 





Figure 2: Conceptualized Path Model 12 
The model in Figure 2 depicts the nine independent variables used in this study, to 
determine whether there is a mediating effect from a BWC, on the decision to take enforcement 
action or exercise discretion.  This type of design, “is a recursive path model because the flow of 
influence goes in a single direction, there is no feedback” (Acock, 2013, p. 63).  Using STATA, 
the user defines the types of testing to compute the relationships for these variables, as well as 
the errors for the endogenous variables (i.e., dependent variables).  This would be repeated for 
each of the scenarios (by changing the dependent variable) as well as the binary output testing 
for minority enforcement, teenage enforcement, labeling, and law enforcement role.  Future 
                                                 




researchers electing to use path analysis, may find it useful for computing and interpreting their 
results, when examining variables for similar relationships.  
Examining the Intersectionality of Race and Gender  
Statistical testing was repeated for intersectionality by removing the individual 
independent variables of Race and Gender, and replacing them with one intersecting variable 
(GendRace).  Potentially relevant intersectionality would present itself as a statistically 
significant finding for a racial group, by gender.  Male white (n=508) represented the largest 
demographic in this study (66.5%). 
Initially, there were 18 GendRace categories in this study (Table 28), which were the 
result of three gender classifications and six racial classifications.  The granularity of this 
GendRace variable was problematic as Native Americans, Asian Females, Black Females, and 
others contained less than twenty respondents. Their responses in these sparsely populated 
categories (as a percentage of their representation in their classification) could skew this analysis. 
Therefore, the variable was reconfigured to include the intersecting variables with more than 
twenty cases, which resulted in five categories (N=713).  Cases with a frequency of twenty 
respondents or less, were excluded from the analysis.  The five categories for GendRace are 
Female White (n=42), Male Black (n=39), Male White (n=508), Male Hispanic (n=83), and 




Table 28: Intersecting Variable Race & Gender  
Officer Race & Gender (Variable coding) Frequency (n) Percentage 
Female Black (1)  10 1.3% 
Female White (2) 42 5.5% 
Female Hispanic/Latina (3) 13 1.7% 
Female Asian (4) 2 0.3% 
Female Amer. Ind., 1st Nation, or Alaskan (5) 1 0.1% 
Female Other (6) 1 0.1% 
Male Black (7) 39 5.1% 
Male White (8) 508 66.5% 
Male Hispanic/Latino (9) 83 10.9% 
Male Asian (10)  41 5.4% 
Male Amer. Ind., 1st Nation, or Alaskan (11) 5 0.7% 
Male Other (12)  15 2.0% 
Other Black (13) 0 N/A 
Other White (14) 2 0.3% 
Other Hispanic/Latino (15) 0 N/A 
Other Asian (16) 1 0.1% 
Other Amer. Ind., 1st Nation, or Alaskan (17) 0 N/A 
Other Other (18) 1 0.1% 
TOTALS 764 100% 
 
None of the statistically significant models contained the intersecting variable GendRace. 
Table 29 captures an overview of the findings for all intersectionality testing.  When gender and 
race were maintained as separate variables, Scenario 4, Scenario 5, Scenario 6, Role in Public 
Safety, and Negative Public Labeling were all statistically significant models.  Substituting the 
intersecting variable resulted in Negative Public Labeling (p=0.1414), Role in Public Safety 
(p=0.0555), and Scenario 5 (p=0.0633) losing their statistical significance (by exceeding the 





Table 29: Overview of Significant Variables for Intersecting Gender and Race  
Test Environment  (N)  Odds Ratio  Probability  
S1: Low-level Offense 556 -- 0.2079 
Supervisor  -- 2.0698 0.018 
S2: Fighting in Street 557 -- 0.1836 
Supervisor -- 2.0751 0.050 
Tenure 11-15  -- 0.2692 0.042 
Tenure 16-20 -- 0.1781 0.015 
Tenure 21-25 -- 0.1756 0.019 
Male Asian -- 5.7788 0.011 
S3: Car Stop 556 -- 0.6739 
S4: Cell phone Challenge 554 -- 0.0034 
Supervisor  -- 3.2265 0.000 
Divorced -- 2.6963 0.034 
S5: Verbal Challenge 555 -- 0.0633 
Supervisor -- 2.2442 0.005 
Married -- 0.1539 0.020 
S6: Passive Challenge 588 -- 0.0236 
Supervisor -- 2.1213 0.017 
Quality Control -- 4.1457 0.030 
H.S. some Coll. -- 10.108 0.024 
Associate Deg. -- 12.273 0.014 
Baccalaureate Deg. -- 10.047 0.019 
Master’s Deg. -- 9.018 0.029 
Discretion and Minorities 397 -- 0.5211 
Scenarios and Teenagers 519 -- 0.0753 
Quality Control -- 2.5137 0.018 
Age 30-39 -- 4.0484 0.042 
Age 40-49 -- 7.3522 0.007 
Age 50+ -- 5.8727 0.021 
Tenure 16-20 -- 0.1923 0.013 
Tenure 21-25 -- 0.2287 0.034 
Tenure 31-35 -- 0.1977 0.048 
Neg. Law Enf. News 487 -- 0.3363 
Tenure 11-15 -- 6.7331 0.033 
Tenure 16-20 -- 7.6262 0.038 
Tenure 21-25 -- 7.6835 0.046 
Separated -- 0.1107 0.035 
Male White -- 3.4282 0.027 
Neg. Public Labeling 630 -- 0.1414 
Associate Deg. -- 3.9518 0.050 




Supervisor -- 3.2443 0.013 
Tenure 11-15 -- 0.0259 0.036 
Tenure 16-20 -- 0.0089 0.009 
Tenure 21-25 -- 0.0083 0.010 
Tenure 26-30 -- 0.0030 0.002 
Tenure 31-35 -- 0.0106 0.034 
First Responder -- 8.3393 0.050 
 Note: Shaded rows are statistically significant.  
Group membership and intersectionality  
 When independent variables Race and Gender were examined as two separate variables, 
neither were statistically significant in any of the scenarios and only demonstrated significance in 
the questions on Negative Public Labeling (Race) and Role in Public Safety (Gender).  However, 
substituting the intersecting variable GendRace resulted in statistical significance for Scenario 2 
(i.e., street fight) and for the question asking whether the respondent was impacted by negative 
law enforcement news.   
 For Scenario 2, Male Asians are five times more likely to take enforcement action than 
White Females (the baseline category for this variable) during a street fight (OR=5.778, 
p=0.011).  When asked whether impacted by negative law enforcement news, Male Whites are 
three times more likely than White Females, to state they are impacted by negative law 
enforcement news (OR=3.4282, p=0.027).   
Findings  
Answers to Research Questions  
RQ 1 asked, “Do verbal and non-verbal challenges from the public to an officer influence 
their decision to take enforcement action?”  This study demonstrates both verbal and non-verbal 
challenges to law enforcement influence their decision for enforcement action. Scenario 4 




Scenario 6 (passive documentation) all show statistically significant law enforcement reactions.  
Challenging an officer while recording them on your cell phone will typically not result in 
enforcement action (62.22%).  However, verbally challenging an officer with no cell phone 
recording (61.06%) or making it a point to manually note police-citizen interaction will result in 
enforcement action (78.12%).  
For Scenario 4 (cell phone), respondents in their open field responses explained they 
either preferred to use discretion (n=120), elected against action irrespective of the presence of 
cell phone recording (n=100), or did not feel fighting in the street was serious enough to warrant 
enforcement (n=77). Only 12 respondents stated they did not take enforcement action out of fear 
of placing their career in jeopardy from negative public feedback.   
For Scenario 5 (verbal challenge), officers explained their enforcement action came from 
their sense of duty (n=194) or despite their enforcement decision, they would still remain 
amenable to discretion, if the circumstances warranted it (136).  In Scenario 6, officers exercised 
enforcement (n=227) because they stated it is their duty.   
Interestingly, 151 respondents stated they specifically exercised enforcement in Scenario 
6 because the exchange was documented.  There is something about the act of physically 
noting/documenting an exchange with law enforcement, that caused police to “cover themselves” 
from retaliatory complaints from the public (i.e., civilian complaints, law suits, etc.).   
RQ 2 asked, “Does a police officer’s perceived law enforcement role govern their 
decision to take police enforcement action?”  There is no indication that an officer’s self-
perceived role (i.e., Safety Expert, Crime Fighter, Problem Solver, First Responder, or 
Peacekeeper) has any influence on their enforcement decision, for the testing scenarios 




RQ 3 asked, “What personal characteristics of police officers influence their decision to 
take police enforcement action?” Divorced officers are almost three times more likely to take 
enforcement action compared to single officers when recorded on a cell phone.  Married officers 
are 56% less likely to take enforcement action compared to single officers when verbally 
challenged.  Officers with college credits, associate, baccalaureate, and master degrees are more 
likely to take enforcement action when passively challenged than officers with high school 
diplomas.  
RQ 4 asked, “What contextual characteristics of police officers influence their decision 
to take police enforcement action?”  Rank was statistically significant in Scenarios 4-6.  
Supervisors were more likely than non-supervisors to elect enforcement when challenged with a 
cell phone, verbally challenged, and passively challenged.  
For Scenarios 4-6, Assignment was the only contextual characteristic with statistical 
significance.  Those assigned to internal affairs or other professional compliance units are more 
likely to take enforcement action than personnel assigned to patrol/field operations. 
RQ 5 asked, “What is the enforcement likelihood when police interact with members of 
minority communities?”  When dealing with members of the minority community 65% of 
officers are more likely to use discretion.  
RQ 6 asked, “What is the enforcement likelihood when police interact with teenagers?”  
When dealing with teenagers, enforcement likelihood is almost even. Fifty-one percent are 
unlikely to take enforcement with teenagers.  For those not taking action, they felt teenagers 
were more problematic to arrest but did not elaborate or they felt the person was young and did 




RQ 7 asked, “How do law enforcement perceive the media, when reporting on law 
enforcement events?”  Over 89% of respondents are affected by negative law enforcements news 
stories.  Almost 60% get their news from broadcast news compared to the 24% that get their law 
enforcement-related news from social media.  
RQ 8 asked, “Is there intersectionality occurring between officers’ race and gender in the 
decision to take police enforcement action?”  Male Asians are five times more likely to take 
enforcement action than White Females during a street fight.  When asked whether impacted by 
negative law enforcement news, Male Whites are three times more likely than White Females, to 
state they are impacted by negative law enforcement news.  
Findings for Hypotheses  
 Although traditional hypothesis testing was not part of this study, three hypotheses were 
posited.   H1 stated, “The introduction of a cell phone in a manner indicative of recording video 
footage will cause some officers to disengage and decide not to arrest/summons a subject.”  The 
introduction of a cell phone during an interaction with a law enforcement officer, held in a 
manner indicative of using it to record a police-citizen interaction, is likely not to result in 
enforcement action.   
H2 stated, “The defined role of the officer as crime fighter will have a greater likelihood 
of arresting/summonsing the citizen/resident.”  There is no indication that officers who define 
their role as Crime Fighter have a statistically significant likelihood for enforcement action.  
H3 stated, “African-American officers will be more likely to exercise discretion in 
scenarios where they are challenged by the public.”  There was no difference with African 
American officers when taking enforcement action or exercising discretion, compared to any 




Applicable Academic Theory in Examining Police Behavior  
If we are to assume Labeling Theory is appropriately explaining police behavior rather 
than their perceived role, we would expect to see officers explaining in their opened-ended 
survey responses that societal challenges to their legitimacy are strong influencers in their 
enforcement decision-making.  We would see evidence of public challenges to officer legitimacy 
(or self-legitimacy) triggering some degree of shaming effect (either specific or general), and 
thereby influencing the officer’s internal metric of enforcement or discretion.  This study did not 
uncover evidence of that. Respondents stated they did feel the public negatively labels law 
enforcement (which was statistically significant) and that police are sensitive to negative law 
enforcement news but there are no corresponding indicators correlating to enforcement action.  
A stronger argument is found in Role Theory, to explain the behavior in this study.  Many 
responses and justifications for discretion or even enforcement (depending on the scenario 
presented) are often explained in terms of role, job, duty, responsibility.  Role Theory posits that 
both contextual and personal characteristics are significant predictors in human behavior. This 
study found the variable Rank, which is a contextual characteristic, significant in the scenarios 
and decision models, along with personal characteristics Education and Family Status, but to 
varying degrees, contingent on the model presented to the respondent.  
Is the Ferguson Effect Occurring?  
If we narrowly script the question whether a Ferguson Effect is occurring for police 
agencies in this study, in terms of increased crime, there is insufficient data to support that claim.  
Of the 10 departments in this study, six post their crime complaint reports on publicly accessible 
websites.  Since this study is protecting the anonymity of its members and the participating 




within a table) of overall index crime, by calendar year, from 2015 through 2018, for six of the 
agencies participating in this study.  Green-colored fields depict decreases in overall index crime 
(i.e., murder, rape, robbery, felony/aggravated assault, burglary, major theft, and car theft) from 






East Coast  
Figure 3: Overall Index Crime for Participating Police Agencies, 2015-2018. 13  
The dynamics of criminal offending and policing are multivariate.  To argue Ferguson, in 
the context of increased crime, would require a causal link between de-policing and/or decreased 
police self-legitimacy to a measured and sustained increase in either overall index crime, or 
lower-level quality of life offenses (i.e., misdemeanors and violations), which is beyond the 
scope of this report, but presents a rich opportunity for researchers.  
Limitations  
 A key limitation in this study was the difficulty in getting police agencies, police unions, 
and municipalities to participate in collecting survey data of their officers.  Asking police 
personnel their likelihood of taking enforcement action against people possibly perceived by 
some officers as baiting or antagonizing them, is not a comfortable exercise in self-reflection.  A 
recent report shows that despite the growing number of studies in policing, and the convenience 
of internet/digital surveying, the number of police officers participating in surveys is decreasing, 
making research into law enforcement concerns, trends, fears and opinions, increasingly difficult 
                                                 




to complete (Nix, Pickett, Baek, & Alpert, 2017, p. 13).  In fact, research indicates, “response 
rates in police surveys have declined over time” (Nix et al, 2017, p. 8).  
Other impediments to collecting survey data from law enforcement is securing the 
requisite permission from police departments, unions, or municipalities (sometimes all three) in 
gaining access to their personnel.  A supervisory member of a mid-western police department 
summarized the trepidation by responding to this researcher, “Look, your study sounds 
interesting but the executives do not wish to participate right now.  You would also have to 
secure simultaneous consent from the labor union and by the way, we’re under a consent decree, 
so you can understand why we’re saying, ‘No.’”   
Nix et al explain, fewer surveys returned from police personnel is not just an American 
problem (2017, p. 10).  Their examination of 497 police surveys, published in 15 journals from 
2008 to 2017, found police in the United States (comprising 51% of their study) were no “more 
or less inclined to respond to surveys than officers working elsewhere” (Nix et al, 2017, p. 10).  
In fact, police participation in surveys has been decreasing over time, with statistical testing 
indicating a, “significant negative correlation between survey year and response rate” (Nix et al, 
2017, p. 8).  
Another limitation in this study are the higher number of supervisory officers responding 
to this dissertation’s surveys, compared to non-supervisory officers.  This was probably a result 
of the convenience sampling used in this analysis, to collect data from police personnel.  As 
stated earlier, convenience sampling is a non-probability-based data collection technique that 
invites participants to partake in survey research, based on their availability to the researcher.  
Soliciting agencies for research friendly executives or relying on favorable word-of-mouth 




academic research into policing and criminology since low survey return rates (around 50%) is 
often the rejection threshold for academic journals (Nix et al, 2017, pp. 7, 9-11).   
Conclusions  
For the law enforcement personnel in this study, the decision to take enforcement action 
is often driven by the public’s demeanor and timbre.  Verbally challenging officer legitimacy or 
making a note of the exchange (in view of the officer)—which is the public’s right—often results 
in a ticket or arrest (depending on the offense and circumstances).  Cell phone recording an 
exchange is unlikely to result in enforcement action.  These findings differ from Chiarlitti’s 
study of 88 police officers and supervisors from three departments in New York state, which 
found that police officers were not swayed from their enforcement duties, due to fears of civil 
litigation (Chiarlitti, 2016, pp. 75-77).  This supports the feedback articulated multiple times in 
this study from respondents.  The balance between enforcement and discretion is conditional, 
and generally difficult to predict, but there are identifiable likelihoods that can help provide 
greater insight into an important dynamic.  
The public’s interpretation of exchanges with law enforcement, was a concern for 
officers and articulated in their responses for Scenario 5—verbal challenges at a public 
demonstration, with no apparent recording of officers.  Respondents were concerned that the 
appearance of LE inaction would embolden protestors and escalate into further civil 
disobedience or violence.  Many stating they would take enforcement action in Scenario 5 
because, “failing to act can get out of control” or “…you protect free speech, but not at the 




Managing Statistical Significance with Strategy  
Scenarios 1-3, as well as enforcement decisions when interacting with minorities, 
teenagers, or the impact of negative law enforcement news in the media, did not demonstrate 
statistical significance.  Just because these specific areas did not indicate statistical significance, 
does not discount the policy, training, and discursive significance, articulated in officers’ 
responses and open field explanations, justifying their enforcement decisions.  Just as LE rely on 
public confidence and credibility to secure the trust necessary to police society, so too does 
policy require public confidence and credibility.  “Police departments and training units need to 
focus on the development and sustainment of attitudes consistent with being fair and just” 
(Chappell & Piquero, 2004). 
Limiting ourselves to purist arguments and narrowly scripted findings runs the risk of 
creating a dearth of information on any topic.  Kettl warns that these unknown unknowns result 
in policy lightening (p. 146) but for many reasons, once unknowns are revealed, we still seem to 
repeat flawed decision making.  The difficulty in postponing policy reform, or the inability to 
make necessary (albeit sometime difficult) policy revisions, further disempowers policy 
reformers, to adopt the type of logic that some institutions and practices are just too big to fail 
(Kettl, 2014, pp. 147-148).  
The importance of this study is beyond assessing the opinions of officers for field scenarios 
and interacting with different demographics.  In terms of policy design and preparation, this 
study can serve as an intelligence report to police agencies because it provides insight into how 
officers see themselves and how they see the public in that discursive exchange.  From a 
strategic policy standpoint, knowing that officers are less likely to engage when a citizen holds 




This disengagement phenomena with publicly introduced cell phones, may change over 
time, if more officers are issued BWCs and law enforcement training conditions them to 
disregard or accept the presence of public recording.  In this study, approximately one-third of 
the officers wear BWCs.  Smith and Anderson (2018, p.1), of the Pew Research Center, 
commenting on internet trends, usage, and technology found, “There are substantial differences 
in social media use by age. Some 88% of 18- to 29-year-olds indicate that they use any form of 
social media. That share falls to 78% among those ages 30 to 49…[and continues to decline with 
age].”  
Recommendations  
This researcher recommends, increased use of intersectionality as a variable, to test for 
the potentiality of disparate impact to groups that may remain unrealized due to aggregated 
variable classifications.  This can be particularly useful in policy analyses, ethical government 
practices, and inclusive problem-solving efforts, to minimize exclusion of groups that 
historically/currently feel marginalized. 
Law enforcement must comprehensively work on strengthening public messaging that 
already exists through Community Policing units in many police departments.  Community 
contacts are a department’s allies in balancing improperly couched narratives disseminated 
through social media.  This tactic could help ensure officer safety, maintain fundamental public 
confidence in their police, and keep officers from disengaging with the public, despite initial 
negative feedback from citizens.   
If social media and public messaging are driving the future of communications platforms 




strategies, so the mistakes and misinformation that may be setting the discourse for police-
community relations, is not carried over into hiring policy.   
Policy Options  
In order to address concerns of potential de-policing, intersectionality, and self-
legitimacy, messaging is key to maintaining communication with the community police serve.  
What better test of a police department’s efficacy and messaging than the representativeness of 
their recruitment and hiring policies, for the municipalities they serve.  
Overall, the membership in American police departments are generally representative of 
the U.S. population (Morin et al, 2017, p.11).  In places where it is not, law enforcement 
executives grow concerned of a disconnect, similar to what occurred in Ferguson, Missouri in 
2014, where a majority of the police department did not reflect the community they served.  Not 
having equity and inclusion in a police department can polarize communities, and exacerbate 
crises.  
Police recruitment strategies  
A cohesive police department (where no group of officers feel ostracized or 
disenfranchised) is key to supporting self-legitimacy in policing and potentially reducing the 
incidence of de-policing.  This has proven challenging for the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) to produce a workforce representative of the population.  In 2015, NYPD Police 
Commissioner William Bratton stated he was working, “to improve NYPD minority 
recruitment…because the NYPD is stronger when it looks more like the city it serves” (Bratton, 
2015c, p. 2).   
The context of that statement was rooted in the fact that although NYC was 26% black, 




some of the impediments to hiring were the long and impersonal process (taking as long as four 
years), as well as the apparent “lack of support for applicants, and the lack of transparency” 
throughout the hiring process (Bratton, 2015c, p. 4; K. Royster, personal communication, 
October 29, 2018).  “A candidate [had] to go to four different places to get everything done” 
(Barker, 2015).  In response, the NYPD centralized much of their recruitment strategy, used 
online platforms to interact with applicants and candidates, and hired a professional advertising 
company to manage their marketing and messaging (K. Royster, personal communication, 
October 29, 2018; M. Watcher, 2018).   
Recruitment challenges  
Market research indicates that recruiting the next generations of young workers into the 
public sector and government work will be challenging. “Even among graduates of public affairs 
programs, the interest in joining the public sector is dwindling as Baby Boomers retire and 
Millennials look elsewhere to make an impact on society” (Linos, 2018b).  A police department 
without an involved and adaptive recruitment initiative may face a crisis in human capital.  This 
can have a direct impact on moral, work conditions, scheduling, and eventually public safety.  
When asked about identifying current challenges to police recruitment, Watcher (2018) 
expressed some of the same concerns as Lino (2018b).  “It certainly is not easy. Police 
departments don’t have the same tools available to them that private companies might—no 
signing bonuses, limited flexibility in job descriptions, and a multitude of other restrictions” 
(Linos, 2018b).  
Effects of targeted messaging  
Linos (2018b) examined how directed messaging impacts respondent willingness to 




join their local police departments to random people between 18-40 years old (Linos, 2018b).  
Linos used four different recruitment messages in her study (in four variations of post cards): 
challenge, serve, impact, and career (Linos, 2018a, pp. 73-73).  Linos found the messages most 
attractive to applicants were those, “that focus on the challenge of being a police officer and 
messages that focus on the long-term career benefits” (Linos, 2018a, p. 77).  “Put together, 
messages that focus on personal benefits are three times as effective as the control and are 
particularly effective for applicants of color and women” (Linos, 2018a, p.77).  
We see from Linos’ study (2018a) that blanked marketing (with a generic job 
announcement) is less effective than targeted marketing.  From Linos’ work, and results from the 
NYPD’s shift in recruitment strategy, this author concludes that effective marketing (i.e., 
successful recruiting) is about clear messaging, where the applicant sees themselves filling the 
role messaged in the advertisement.  The NYPD’s new recruitment strategy appropriately 
addresses concerns shared by Linos’ (2018b), suggesting that easing the administrative burdens 
placed on candidates in the hiring process, might improve the application process.  
Leveraging a best practice  
 Other police departments experiencing difficulty with attaining representative recruitment 
from their pool of hirable candidates may find the NYPD’s utilization of a multi-platformed, 
comprehensive recruitment campaign, with a strong social media footprint, all managed by a 
professional advertising agency a smart practice.  A notable limitation for other departments 
(particularly smaller, less well-funded agencies) may be cost, as the NYPD spends millions on 
their recruitment initiative.  This study recommends smaller departments consider joint or 
regional advertising initiatives.  By combining available funding opportunities and sharing costs, 





Appendix A: Survey—Informed Consent Form  
Introduction 
You are requested to consider participating in a research study conducted by Christopher 
Mercado for a dissertation under the supervision of Dr. Maki (Maria) Haberfeld of the 
Department of Law, Police Science, and Criminal Justice Administration of John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, CUNY.  You are asked to participate because of your position as a sworn 
municipal law enforcement officer in the United States.   
 
Purpose of this Study 
This study asks you to provide feedback on what conditions would change your decision to take 
discretionary enforcement action given the trends in recent years of officer-involved shootings 
and use of force resulting in the death or injury of members of the public.  When police use 
force, it is sometimes captured on cell phone video and broadcast over the internet through social 
media, sometimes in real-time.  The resulting police response to this public challenge is referred 
to by some scholars as the Ferguson Effect. You are asked to answer this survey’s questions 
within your role as a law enforcement officer.  The purpose of this research is to ascertain the 
degree you feel the Ferguson Effect impacts your behavior in dealing with the public.  I will also 
ask you to provide feedback to determine if the Ferguson Effect causes you to rethink, re-
examine, or second-guess interactions with the public shortly before and after they transpire.  
 
Definitions 
For clarity and easier interpretation, the term college will mean both colleges and universities.   
 
For the purposes of this study, law enforcement officer includes all ranks of uniformed officers, 
from chiefs and executives to entry-level officers (post-academy trained) including officers 




This is an anonymous survey.  You are reading the consent form. If you agree, activate the 
consent when prompted and begin the survey after carefully reading all instructions.  Your 
responses are anonymous.  No IP addresses or emails are recorded with (or attributed to) this 
survey.  
 
Benefits of Taking Part in this Study 
Your responses in this survey can help shape future police/community engagement policy and 
training as well as assist police departments and community groups with revising (and hopefully 






There is no compensation for participating in this study. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, activate the appropriate response when on the computer. 
Do not put your name in any of your responses for the open-ended questions. This survey could 
take approximately 15 minutes to complete but be clear with your answers.  
 
Upon request, this researcher will share his findings with survey respondents.  
 
This educational study uses human research participants and is subject to ethical and legal 
guidelines. The proposal for this research and the survey tool to collect data for it were submitted 
and approved by John Jay College of Criminal Justice’s Institutional Review Board. There is no 
risk involved in participating in this research. No data identifying you will be released to the 
university or your department. All research will be conducted with the highest ethical standards 
for anonymity.   
 
Your rights in this study are: 
1. Have the purpose, expected risks, and potential benefits fully explained to you before you 
choose to participate 
2. Withdraw from participation at any time without penalty  
3. Refuse to answer a particular question without penalty  
4. Be informed of the results of the study  
 
If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact the researcher, Christopher 
Mercado at chmercado@jjay.cuny.edu 
 
 
Declaration of Consent (Check only one box, sign your name, fill in today’s date) 
 
I have carefully read the informed consent form for this research.   
 
•  Yes, I consent to answer this survey 
 







Appendix B: Survey Questions  
Instructions:  
Answer each question honestly and from your position as a law enforcement officer.  
Some answers require you to respond along a scale. Clearly mark your choices for these answers.  
Only choose one response that best answers the question for these types of questions.  Some 
questions are “fill in.”  Use the space provided to write your answer.  Do not place your name or 
other personally identifying marks on the survey. This helps ensure your anonymity.  
 
 Make sure to completely fill out each answer. Thank you for your participation in this. 
Sincerely, Christopher Mercado.  
 
 
Part I: General Questions: select only one option or fill in the blank  
Question 1:  Which identifier best describes your position with your department?  
 Non-supervisor (e.g. Police officer, deputy sheriff, constable, corporal, senior patrol 
officer, detective, or investigator)  
 Supervisor (e.g. Sergeant: first-line/field supervisor; Lieutenant: first-tier middle-
management, platoon commander; Captain: first-level executive, commander, Major, 
Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel; Chief or sheriff: one, two, three, etcetera stars, or senior-
level executive)  
 
Question 2:  Which category best describes the nature of your assignment?  
 Field operations/enforcement (patrol, narcotics, vice, SWAT/special services, etc.)  
 Staff & support/administrative/clerical (primarily office work)  
 Training/instructional (e.g. police academy instructor)  




Question 3:  Which category best identifies your gender identity?  
 Female  
 Male  
 Non-gender specific (other)  
 
Question 4: Which range best captures your age?   
 20—29 years old  
 30—39 years old  
 40—49 years old  
 50—over  
 
Question 5:  What is your highest education level achieved? 
 High School diploma  
 High School with some college, but no college degree  
 Associate degree  
 Baccalaureate degree  
 Master’s degree  
 Law degree  
 Doctorate  
 
Question 6:  Which best describes your seniority with your department (i.e. time on the job)?  
 Newly graduated from the academy—5 years  
 6 years—10 years  
 11 years—15 years  
 16 years—20 years  
 21 years—25 years  
 26 years—30 years  
 31 years—35 years  




Question 7:  Which best describes your family status? 
 Single—never married  
 Married  
 Married but separated  
 Divorced  
 Single—widowed  
 
Question 8:  What is your race/ethnicity?  For multiracial respondents, chose the one category 
that best defines you.   
 African-American (i.e. Black)  
 Caucasian (i.e. White)  
 Hispanic/Latino(a)  
 Asian or Pacific Islander  
 American Indian (i.e. First Nation) or Alaskan Native  
 Other (________________) If selected, please specify  
 
Question 9: As a law enforcement officer, how would you define your primary role?  
 Safety expert   
 Crime fighter   
 Problem solver  
 First responder/rescuer   
 Peacekeeper   
 
Question 10:  Do you think you play an important role in public safety and maintaining social 
order?  
 Yes   




Question 11:  Do you think the public places negative labels on law enforcement officers?  
 Yes   
 No   
 
Question 12:  When on patrol, do you:  
 Wear a body camera (Body Worn Camera or BWC)   
 Have a vehicle mounted camera in your patrol car/cruiser   
 Have both a BWC and car mounted camera  
 Have neither  
 
Part II: Please read each scenario and respond (check one response and fill in the answer) 
IMPORTANT NOTE: For each scenario, you are in uniform (i.e. bullet resistant vest, gun, radio, 
etcetera) on patrol, in a marked police car.  There is no doubt or ambiguity to anyone on the 
street, you are a law enforcement officer.  
 
Scenario 1: You happen across an adult person violating the law.  The offense constitutes a low-
level misdemeanor (drinking in public, playing loud music, or similar offense impacting resident 
quality-of-life).  Assume your field investigation uncovers no warrants and there are no further 
offenses.  The offense may be correctable by either an arrest or summons. You can also decide to 
exercise discretion and not take any enforcement action.  There are other people in the vicinity of 
the person but they do not appear to be involved.  
 
Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?  
 Yes  
 No  
 








Scenario 2:  You encounter two adult people fighting in the street over a personal issue between 
the two.  You separate them and get them calm enough to tell you what happened.  A 
disagreement over the final score of a sporting event led to an exchange of fists.  Neither party 
seems physically injured.  There are bystanders in the area but they are just watching what is 
going on.  Assume your field investigation uncovers no warrants and there are no further 
offenses.  
 
Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?  
 Yes  
 No  
 






Scenario 3:  You have a motorist stopped for a traffic violation you observed.  The motorist 
hands over their license, registration, and insurance documents when ordered to do so.  Assume 
your field investigation uncovers no warrants and there are no further offenses.  The offense may 
be correctable by either an arrest or summons (depending on the infraction). You can also decide 
to exercise discretion and not take any enforcement action.   
 
Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?  
 Yes  
 No  
 







Scenario 4:  You encounter two adult people fighting in the street.  You get out of your car, 
separate the parties, start getting all the facts and begin asking people present what happened.  It 
does not appear to be a domestic case or robbery.  Right now, it seems there was a disagreement 
between two people that escalated to fists getting thrown. Neither party seems physically injured. 
A bystander at the scene objects to you (a law enforcement officer) being there and pulls out a 
cell phone with arm extended, obviously recording you. The person recording you does not 
make any statements and is not physically preventing you from doing your job.  You notice 
other people present are doing the same thing and also use their cell phones to record your 
handling of this incident. Assume your field investigation uncovers no warrants and there are no 
further offenses.  
 
Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?  
 Yes  
 No  
 





Scenario 5:  A demonstration pops-up in front of you on the corner. There are about 8-10 adult 
protestors holding up signs, chanting, handing out flyers to passersby, and demonstrating their 
unhappiness with an issue. In order to ensure the sidewalk remains free and unobstructed, you 
ask the protestors to remain in a given area of the block. This also keeps them from spilling into 
the roadway and interfering with vehicular or bicycle traffic.  Most comply. The protestors are 
free to move around but remain in the general cordon you established.  Assume these actions are 
in accordance with your department’s policies and procedures.  Two of the protestors are not 
complying with the cordon you established, in violation of the law. They begin yelling at you.  
They tell you and all those who would listen you are a racist, murderous arm of an oppressive 
government.  They are telling you how much their lives matter and say you should be ashamed 




stop and continue on their way. No one appears to be recording you on any cell phone or 
device. No one is physically preventing you from doing your job.  One of the protestors not 
complying with you loudly reads out your name and badge number from your uniform and says 
you have no business or authority policing people.  
 
Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?  
 Yes  
 No  






Scenario 6:  You pulled over a motorist in their mid-30s for a traffic infraction. You have them 
safely stopped; their windows are rolled down.  You are standing outside the motorist’s car, 
talking to them as they remain seated in the driver’s seat. The motorist is handing you their 
license, registration, and insurance information.  Pedestrian and vehicular traffic is typical for the 
time of day. The motorist gets the attention of some people on the sidewalk and says to them, 
“This is garbage.  Pulling me over because the officer must think I’m in the wrong neighborhood 
or something.”  The motorist goes on to say to the bystanders, “This is profiling and 
discrimination.”  The motorist does not challenge you or converse with you specifically about 
their discontent, but they continue to talk with the onlookers.  You head back to your police car 
with the motorist’s documents. You notice some pedestrians are writing down on paper the 
intersection, your radio car number, and making notes about the stop.  You hear one person 
writing down the information tell another, “Try to get his name and badge number too.  We may 
need it later.”  No one is recording you on any cell phones or devices. No one is physically 





Based on your role as a law enforcement officer, would you take enforcement action?  
 Yes  
 No  






THIS ENDS THE SCENARIOS – PLEASE ANSWER THESE LAST FEW QUESTIONS 
Question 13:  In the above scenarios, suppose the violator(s) are teens (below 18 years old). Are 
you:  
 Likely to take enforcement action  
 Unlikely to take enforcement action  





Question 14: Since 2014, there were several protests and events across the United States 
connected with police practices, tragedies, and loss of life for officers and members of the public. 
Many of these issues concern police interaction with members of minority communities (i.e. 
people of color).  When interacting with members of the minority community in enforcement 
action for low-level misdemeanor or petty offenses (when compared to other ethnic groups you 
encounter). Are you: 
 
 More likely to extend discretion to the person  









Question 15:  When news stories break in other parts of the country involving U.S. law 
enforcement officers attacked, involved in corruption scandals, or videoed in potentially negative 
situations, are you affected by those events, even if that agency and municipality is far from your 
own?  
 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Question 16:  Where are you most likely to get your information and news on what is going on 
with law enforcement officers in the U.S.?  Please pick only one.  
 
 Your department’s supervisors, leaders, or executives  
 Broadcast news networks (e.g., Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, ABC, CBS)  
 Social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, Tumblr, Snapchat)  
 Union officials or union delegates (e.g., benevolent associations, Fraternal Order of 
Police)  




Question 17: When negative law enforcement news is in the public discourse, which of the 
below choices (pick one) best describes how you’ve felt:  
 
 You ask yourself, “Is this also a problem in my department too?”   
 I need to be more safety conscious and tactically alert on patrol.   
 Give it time and this will blow over.   
 The activists may be right, this problem never gets properly addressed.   
 Law enforcement is always getting unfairly maligned and mischaracterized in the news.  
 Depends on how “close to home” the incident is.   
 It may help to “cut the public some slack” during enforcement encounters until this gets 
better.  
 I just continue to do my job as I have always done.  
 






Appendix C: Agency Consent Form—Surveys  
 The _______________ Police Department grants Christopher Mercado—a PhD student 
with John Jay College, City University of New York—permission and authority to administer 
surveys to members of this department as part of his doctoral dissertation research in criminal 
justice, examining police behavior and response.  The survey will be administered through 
Survey Monkey and sent as a link to their department email accounts.  
 These surveys are confidential which means respondents’ identities will not be released 
or reported.  Mr. Mercado reserves the right to administer follow-up survey questions (where 
necessary) to clarify responses.  Mr. Mercado’s research will be supervised by his dissertation 
chairperson and in accordance with the precepts of John Jay/CUNY’s Institutional Review 
Board.  
 The _________ Police Department agrees to designate a point-of-contact for Mr. 
Mercado’s research that will liaise whenever necessary to complete this research. There is no 
discernable financial cost to the ________________ Police Department for administering the 
aforementioned survey. The data and survey tools remain the sole property of the researcher—
Christopher Mercado. Mr. Mercado agrees to share his research findings with the ____________ 
Police Department upon completion of his research, if requested.  
Signature___________Agency Representative XXX Police Department 
___________________Date 
 
Signature_________Christopher Mercado (Researcher) 
_________________Date 

















Appendix E: Interview Questions on NYPD Recruitment  
Below are the ten questions used to interview NYPD personnel about recruitment 
practices.  The questions allowed for open responses from interviewees.  Respondents were 
allowed to expand on their answers or qualify their statements.  
1. What is/was your role in candidate recruitment?  
2. How long were you with (or worked in) candidate recruitment?  
3. What is your current assessment of the recruit hiring program?  
4. How has that changed over time?  
5. How much did those changes cost?  
6. What changes (if any) were you part of?  
7. What was the need for those changes?  
8. How do you currently measure the recruiting program’s success and how has that 
measure changed over time?  
9. What changes (if an) do you want for the NYPD’s recruitment policy, programs, 
and strategy?  
















































Appendix H: Recommendations from the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing  
Table 30: Recommendations from the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
Strategy Description 
Building Trust & Legitimacy Promoting trust and ensuring legitimacy through 
procedural justice, accountability, and honest 
recognition  
Policy & Oversight Developing policies on key topics while 
implementing formal checks/balances and data 
collection/analysis  
Technology & Social Media Balancing technology and digital communications 
with local needs, privacy, assessment, and 
monitoring  
Community Policing & Crime 
Reduction 
Community partnerships to reduce crime 
Training & Education  Partnerships with local and national training 
facilities  
Officer Wellness & Safety Practices that support officer wellness and safety by 
evaluating officer shift hours and data to prevent 
injuries 





Appendix I: U.S. Law Enforcement Killed or Assaulted, Annual Data, 1988-2017  
Table 31: Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted, 1988-2017  
Year Feloniously Killed Assaulted 
1988 78 58,916 
1989 66 62,172 
1990 66 72,270 
1991 71 62,852 
1992 63 81,252 
1993 70 66,975 
1994 79 64,912 
1995 74 56,686 
1996 55 46,695 
1997 65 49,151 
1998 61 59,545 
1999 42 55,026 
2000 51 56,054 
2001 72 56,666 
2002 56 58,066 
2003 52 57,841 
2004 57 59,373 
2005 55 57,546 
2006 48 58,634 
2007 57 59,201 
2008 41 58,792 
2009 48 57,268 
2010 56 53,469 
2011 72 54,774 
2012 48 52,901 
2013 27 49,851 
2014 51 48,315 
2015 41 50,212 
2016 66 57,180 
2017 46 60,211 




Appendix J: Coding Classification for Open-text Scenario Reponses  
Table 32: Aggregated Written Responses to Scenarios 
Code Written Responses 
1 Yes, take enforcement action because you’re paid to enforce the law. Broken 
Windows. To discourage poor behavior. Doing nothing sends the wrong message. 
Because it’s the law. It’s my job. It’s my duty to enforce the law. Show no fear. 
Adults are responsible for their actions. It’s department policy.   
2 Yes, take enforcement action, but it depends on the circumstances. The decision is 
conditional. Use discretion. You’re doing it to correct behavior. Look to take other 
corrective action first.  
3 No, don’t take corrective action. Use discretion. Are you addressing a chronic 
condition?  If the person is willing to cease and desist, don’t take enforcement 
action.   
4 Don’t take enforcement action. Not in today’s climate. Don’t lose your pension. 
No public support to act. It’s not worth the aggravation. Can’t risk discipline. Don’t 
be the bad guy. No political backing. Situation could go bad. The risk outweighs 
the reward. Don’t want to escalate things. It will get dismissed at court. Don’t want 
public scrutiny or the public berating me. Politicians want “hands off” policing.   
5 Warn and admonish. Give a warning. Issue stern warning.  
6 No enforcement because offense is minor. Petty offense. Not serious enough. Not 
warranted. Bigger fish to fry.  
7 Inappropriate response. Jibe at the researcher. Nonsensical. Objects to/disagrees 
with the question.  
8 Being recorded changes nothing, take enforcement action. 
9 No offense here so no need for enforcement. Send them on their way.  
10 Being recorded/challenged changes nothing, don’t take enforcement action.  
11 Take enforcement action but request additional resources.  
12 Because I’m being filmed/recorded, I’m more likely to exercise discretion.   
13 Because I’m being filmed/recorded, I’m taking enforcement action. To the Civilian 





Appendix K: Coding Classification, Open-text Reponses for Enforcement on Teenagers  
Table 33: Aggregated Written Responses on Policing Teens  
Code Written Responses 
1 No, don’t take enforcement action against the teen because juveniles are more 
of a headache. They are more of a problem.  Kids need more latitude.  Give kids 
a break.  Why ruin their lives? This is a teaching moment. Kids will be kids.  
Contact the parent.  It’s a minor infraction. No crime here.  
2 Yes, take enforcement action against the teen: because age is not a disqualifier. 
This is a teaching opportunity for proper behavior. Correct the bad behavior 
now. Correct them now because age has no bearing.  Kids act worse than adults.  
3 Warn and admonish.  
4 Non-specific response. Unrelated commentary. Objection to the question.  
5 No, don’t take enforcement action: age doesn’t make a difference. Age doesn’t 
necessarily change the enforcement decision.  
6 Yes, take enforcement action against the teen; age doesn’t make a difference.  
The law is the law.  
7 Yes, take enforcement action against the teen, but consider the kid’s demeanor 
in your decision. Consider mitigating circumstances. Level of respect.  
8 No, don’t take enforcement action against the teen, but consider the kid’s 
demeanor (attitude/maturity) in your decision. Consider mitigating 
circumstances. 
9 Do nothing. It’s a waste of time. It’s useless to do anything in this scenario. 
You have no political or police department support/back-up for your actions. I 
don’t care anymore. Apathy response. 
10 Yes, take enforcement action, to protect yourself against allegations of 




Appendix L: Coding Classification, Open Reponses on Minority Discretion  
Table 34: Open Responses to Minority Discretion  
Code Written Responses 
1 More likely to extend discretion; I treat everyone the same.  I remain objective. 
Race doesn’t matter to me.  
2 Less likely to extend discretion; I treat everyone the same. Race doesn’t matter to 
me.  
3 More likely to extend discretion; since I judge the severity/gravity and totality of 
the circumstances for each incident.  
4 Less likely to extend discretion; since I judge the severity/gravity and totality of 
the circumstances for each incident. 
5 More likely to extend discretion; because I don’t want to be judged as racist. 
Enforcement would look bad on social media. Fear of being scapegoated. Don’t 
force a confrontation. It’s not worth it.  Don’t escalate situation. Avoid complaints. 
6 Less likely to extend discretion; because I’m treated unfairly and with hostility in 
racial situations.  I’m more likely to be challenged.  
7 Warn and admonish.  
8 Open response. Commentary not tied to any of the choices. Inappropriate 
response. Question considered offensive. Objection to the question. Nonsensical 
comment.  Expressed indifference or confusion in their written response.  
9 More likely to extend discretion, because my department/agency, the city, “they,” 
or society expect me to be lenient with minorities. Leadership changed.  
10 Less likely to extend discretion, and I will thoroughly document/record.  
everything about the encounter. I need to, “cover my butt.”  Need to go by the 
book. Avoid problems. Avoid discipline.  
11 More likely to extend discretion to acknowledge or correct prior wrongs or to 
combat implicit or historical biases.  To change past negative perceptions of law 
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